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Essays on Money and Credit: A New Monetarist Approach 
 
Daniel R Sanches 
 
 
Chapter 1: Money and Credit with Limited Commitment and Theft 
 
Credit contracts and fiat money seem to be robust means of payment in the sense that we 
observe both monetary exchange and credit transactions under a wide array of 
technologies and monetary policy rules. However, a common result in a large class of 
models of money and credit is that the optimal monetary policy -- usually the Friedman 
rule -- eliminates any transactions role for credit: money drives credit out of the 
economy. In this sense, money and credit are not robust in the model. We study the 
interplay among imperfect recordkeeping, limited commitment, and theft, in an 
environment that can support both monetary exchange and credit arrangements. 
Imperfect recordkeeping makes outside money socially useful, but it also permits theft of 
currency to go undetected, and therefore provides lucrative opportunities for thieves in 
decentralized exchange. First, we show that imperfect recordkeeping and limited 
commitment are not sufficient to account for the robust coexistence of money and credit. 
Then, we show that theft, together with imperfect recordkeeping and limited 
commitment, is sufficient to account for the robust coexistence, given that theft imposes a 
cost on monetary exchange. The Friedman rule is in general not optimal with theft, and 
the optimal money growth rate tends to rise as the cost of theft falls. 
  iii 
Chapter 2: Unsecured Loans and the Initial Cost of Lending 
 
We study the terms of credit in a competitive market where sellers are willing to 
repeatedly finance the purchases of buyers by extending direct credit. Lenders (sellers) 
can commit to deliver any long-term credit contract that does not result in a payoff that is 
lower than that associated with autarky while borrowers (buyers) cannot commit to any 
contract. A borrower's ability to repay a loan is privately observable. As a result, the 
terms of credit within an enduring relationship change over time according to the history 
of trades. Although there is free entry of lenders in the credit market, each lender has to 
pay a cost to contact a borrower. We show that a lower cost makes each borrower better 
off from the perspective of the contracting date, results in less variability in a borrower's 
expected discounted utility, and makes each lender uniformly worse off ex post. As this 
cost approaches zero, the credit contract offered by a lender converges to a full-insurance 
contract. 
 
Chapter 3: Costly Recordkeeping, Settlement System, and Monetary Policy 
 
We study an arrangement in which the government provides a public settlement system 
to the private sector and evaluate its implications for the implementation of monetary 
policy. A key ingredient of the analysis is that it is costly for the government to operate a 
record-keeping technology which is necessary for the construction of a settlement system 
through which private loans and tax liabilities are settled. For this reason, the choice of 
the optimal size of a settlement system by the government is non-trivial. Another benefit 
  iv 
of such a system is that it allows the government to effectively control the money supply. 
We show that the Friedman rule is suboptimal. Money and credit coexist as means of 
payment at the optimum. The government relies on a credit system to implement an 
optimal policy because of the role of credit in relaxing cash constraints. As a result, 
money and credit are complementary in transactions: the existence of a credit system 
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1 Money and Credit with Limited Commitment
and Theft1
1.1 Introduction
It is hard to nd examples of economies in which we do not observe the use of both
money and credit in transactions. Thus, we should think of money and credit as
robust, in the sense that we will observe transactions involving both money and credit
under a wide array of technologies and monetary policy rules. One goal of this paper
is to help us understand what is required to obtain robustness of money and credit
in an economic model. Then, given robustness, we want to explore the implications
for monetary policy. As well, this paper will serve to tie together some key ideas in
monetary economics.
As is now well known, barriers to the ow of information across locations and over
time appear to be critical to the role that money plays in exchange. If there were
no such barriers, in particular if there were perfect memory, i.e. recordkeeping,
then it would be possible to support e¢ cient allocations in the absence of valued
money see Kocherlakota (1998). One can think of the models of Green (1987), or
Atkeson and Lucas (1992), as determining e¢ cient allocations with credit arrangements
under private information, where the memory of past transactions by economic agents
supports incentive compatible intertemporal exchange. As Kocherlakota (1998) points
out, spatial separation of the type encountered in turnpike models such as Townsend
(1980) or random matching models such as Trejos and Wright (1995) also yields
e¢ cient credit arrangements under perfect memory. Aiyagari and Williamson (1999)
study an environment with private information and random matching where credit
arrangements are e¢ cient. Thus, neither private information nor spatial separation
is a su¢ cient friction to provide a socially useful role for monetary exchange. Both
1Joint project with Stephen Williamson.
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frictions mitigate credit arrangements, but not to the point where monetary exchange
necessarily improves matters.
The work of Kocherlakota (1996, 1998) seems to suggest that limited commitment
works much like private-information and spatial frictions, in that it in general implies
less intertemporal exchange than would occur in its absence, but does not imply a
welfare-improving role for money. However, in the case of limited commitment, this is
not obvious. For example, suppose that two economic agents, A and B meet. Agent
A can supply B with something that B wants, but all that B can o¤er in exchange is
a promise to supply A with some object in the future. Agent B is unable to commit,
and what A is willing to give to B will depend on A0s ability to punish B; or to have
other economic agents punish B; if he or she fails to fulll his or her promises in the
future. The amount of credit that A is willing to extend to B will in general be limited.
However, suppose that B has money to o¤er A in exchange. Possibly A and B can
trade more e¢ ciently using money, or by using money and credit, because monetary
exchange is not subject to limited commitment.
First, we wish to construct a framework which can potentially permit monetary
exchange, trade using credit under limited commitment, and the coexistence of valued
money and credit. We build on the model of Rocheteau and Wright (2005) and Lagos
and Wright (2005), which has quasilinear utility and alternating decentralized and
centralized trading among economic agents. This lends tractability to our analysis,
but we think that the basic ideas are quite general.
The rst result is that, consistent with Kocherlakota (1998), limited commitment
is in fact not su¢ cient to provide a social role for money in our model. The result
hinges on the fact that lack of commitment applies to tax liabilities as well as private
liabilities. If there is perfect memory and limited commitment matters, then limited
commitment also may make the Friedman rule infeasible for the government. This is
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because agents may want to default on the tax liabilities that are required to support
deation at the Friedman rule rate. While it is possible in special cases for money to
be valued in equilibrium with limited commitment and perfect memory, there is no
welfare-improving role for money. This is similar to the avor of some results in the
monetary model without credit considered by Andolfatto (2008).
As mentioned above, one of our aims in this paper is to determine a set of frictions
under which money and credit are both robust as means of payment. Clearly, perfect
memory does not provide conditions under which monetary exchange is robust, so we
need to add imperfect memory to provide a role for money. However, we do not want
to shut down memory entirely, as is typical in some monetary models e.g. Lagos and
Wright (2005) as this will also shut down credit. We use a hybrid approach, whereby
decentralized meetings between buyers and sellers are either monitored, or are not. A
monitored trade is subject to perfect memory, while there is no access to memory in
non-monitored transactions see also Deviatov and Wallace (2009).
In this context, our results depend critically on the punishments that are triggered
by default in the credit market. For tractability, we consider global punishments,
whereby default by a borrower will imply that all would-be lenders refuse to extend
credit. At the extreme, this can result in global autarky. With global autarky as an
o¤-equilibrium path supporting valued money and credit in equilibrium, higher money
growth lowers the rate of return on money, and there is substitution of credit for money.
E¢ cient monetary policy is either a Friedman rule, if incentive constraints do not bind
at the optimum, or else optimal money growth is greater than at the Friedman rule
and incentive constraints bind at the optimum. In either case, e¢ cient monetary policy
drives out credit. Money works so well that if the government gives money a su¢ ciently
high rate of return there will be no lending in equilibrium.
We also consider o¤-equilibrium punishments that are less severe than autarky.
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Much as in Aiyagari and Williamson (2000) or in Antinol, Azariadis, and Bullard
(2007), we allow punishment equilibria to include monetary exchange. That is, if
a borrower defaults, this triggers a global punishment where there is no credit, but
agents can trade money for goods. Here, the only equilibrium that can be supported
is one with no credit, and with a xed stock of money (also implying a constant
price level in our model). This is quite di¤erent from results obtained in Aiyagari
and Williamson (2000) or Antinol, Azariadis, and Bullard (2007). A key di¤erence
in our setup is that we take account of the fact that the government cannot commit
to punishing private agents through monetary policy. When a default occurs, the
government adjusts monetary policy so that it is a best response to the decision rules
that private agents adopt as punishment behavior.
Imperfect memory provides a role for money, but in the context of imperfect memory
alone, money in some sense works too well in our model, relative to what we see in
reality. That is, optimal monetary policy always drives credit out of the system. This
is a typical result, which is obtained for example in Irelands cash-in-advance model
of money and credit  see Ireland (1994). Irelands model has the property that a
Friedman rule is optimal and, at the Friedman rule, all transactions are conducted with
cash, which eliminates the costs of using credit. The intuition for this is quite clear.
All alternatives to using currency in transactions come at a cost, for example there are
costs of operating a debit-card or credit-card system, there are costs to clearing checks,
etc. If it is costless to produce currency and to carry it around, then if the government
generates a deation that induces a rate of return on money equivalent to that on the
best safe asset, then this should be e¢ cient, and it should also eliminate the use of all
cash substitutes in transactions.
Of course, in practice it is costly for the government to operate a currency system.
For example, maintaining the currency stock by printing new currency to replace worn-
4
out notes and coins is costly, as is counterfeiting and the prevention of counterfeiting.
As well, a key cost of holding currency is the risk of theft, which has been studied, for
example, in He, Huang, andWright (2008). We model theft di¤erently here, and do this
in the context of monitored credit transactions. That is, we assume that it is possible
for sellers, at a cost, to steal currency in non-monitored transactions, but theft is not
possible if the transaction is monitored. This changes our results dramatically. Now,
monetary policy will a¤ect the amount of theft in existence, and theft will matter for
how borrowers are punished in the event of default. For example, if the o¤-equilibrium
punishment path involves no credit market activity and only monetary exchange, then
the risk of theft is higher on the o¤-equilibrium path, and this reduces welfare in the
punishment equilibrium.
At the optimum it will always be optimal for the government to eliminate theft.
Theft will matter for policy, but in the model theft will not be observed in equilibrium.
Because theft is potentially more prevalent with o¤-equilibrium punishment, however,
money and credit will in general coexist at the optimum. When theft matters, the
Friedman rule is not optimal, and the optimal money growth rate tends to increase as
the cost of theft falls.
1.2 The Environment
Time is discrete and each period is divided into two subperiods: day and night. There
are two types of agents in the economy, buyers and sellers, and there is a continuum of
each type with unit measure. There is a unique perishable consumption good which is
produced and consumed within each subperiod. During the day, a seller can produce
one unit of the consumption good with one unit of labor. At night, a buyer is able to
produce one unit of the consumption good with one unit of labor.
5
A buyer has preferences given by
1X
t=0
t[u (qt)  nt] (1.1)
where qt is consumption during the day, and nt is labor supply at night, with  2 (0; 1)
the discount factor between night and day. Assume u() is strictly concave, strictly
increasing, and twice continuously di¤erentiable with u(0) = 0; u0(0) =1; and dene
q to be the solution to u0(q) = 1: A seller has preferences given by
1X
t=0
t( lt + xt) (1.2)
where lt is labor supply during the day and xt is consumption at night. Sellers and
buyers discount at the same rate. Agents are bilaterally and randomly matched during
the day and at night trade is centralized.
1.3 Planners Problem
1.3.1 Full Commitment
First, consider what a social planner could achieve in this economy in the absence of
money. Ultimately, money will consist of perfectly divisible and durable objects that
are portable at zero cost, and can be produced only by the government. In this section
assume there is complete memory and that each agent can commit to the plan proposed
by the social planner at t = 0: If the planner treats all sellers identically and all buyers
identically, then an allocation f(qt; xt)g1t=0 satises the participation constraints
1X
t=0




t( qt + xt)  0; (1.4)
which state that a buyer and a seller, respectively, each prefer to participate in the
plan at t = 0: Then, if we conne attention to stationary allocations with qt = q and
6
xt = x for all t; we must have
u (q)  x  0 (1.5)
and
 q + x  0 (1.6)
The set of feasible stationary allocations is given by (2.5) and (3.4), and this set
is non-empty given our assumptions. Further, the set of e¢ cient allocations is also
non-empty, satisfying (2.5), (3.4) and q = q:
1.3.2 Limited Commitment
Now, continue to assume complete memory, but now suppose that any agent can at
any time opt out of the plan. The worst punishment that the planner can impose is
zero consumption forever for an agent who deviates. Let vt denote the utility of a
buyer at the beginning of t; with wt similarly denoting the utility of a seller. Then an
allocation must satisfy the participation constraints (2.3) and (3.3) as before, as well
as the incentive constraints
 xt + vt+1  0; (1.7)
and
 qt + xt + wt+1  0 (1.8)
for t = 0; 1; 2; :::;1: Constraints (3.5) and (3.6) state that the buyer and seller, respec-
tively, prefer to produce at each date rather than defecting from the plan.








 q + x  (1  )w:
where w is the sellers lifetime utility. At the optimum, the sellers incentive constraint
binds, so that x = q + (1  )w. Now, let q denote the solution to u(q) = q:
We can then rewrite the buyers incentive constraint as
u(q)  q  (1  )w: (1.9)
Given that w  0, we must have q 2 [0; q]. Then, we can rewrite the planners
problem in the following way:
max
q2[0;q]
u (q)  q   (1  )w
subject to (3.7). The rst-order conditions are
u0 (q)  1 +  [u0 (q)  1]  0; with equality if q < q; (1.10)
and
 [u(q)  q   (1  )w] = 0;
where   0 is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the constraint (3.7).
Suppose that q  q. Then, (3.8) holds with equality. If  > 0, then the buyers
incentive constraint (3.7) binds, and any q 2 [q^; q], together with x = u (q), is an
e¢ cient allocation. If  = 0, then from (3.8) any q = q, together with x 2 [q; u (q)],
is an e¢ cient allocation. In Figure 1, the set of e¢ cient allocations with limited
commitment for the case q  q is ABC, and the set of e¢ cient allocations under
full commitment is AD. Notice that the incentive constraint binds for the e¢ cient
allocations BC.
The perhaps more interesting case is when q < q; in which case the set of e¢ cient
allocations is f(q; x) : x = u(q); q 2 [q^; q]; u0(q^) = 1g. This case is depicted in
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Figure 2, where the set of e¢ cient allocations is AB: That is, in this case the incentive
constraint for the buyer always binds for the e¢ cient stationary allocation, and an
e¢ cient allocation with limited commitment is not e¢ cient under full commitment.
1.4 Equilibrium Allocations with Perfect Memory
To establish a benchmark, we rst assume that there is perfect memory. As we would
expect from the work of Kocherlakota (1998), this will severely limit the role of money
in this economy. An important element of the model will be the bargaining protocol
carried out when a buyer and seller meet during the daytime. We assume that the
seller rst announces whether or not he or she is willing to trade with the buyer. If
the seller is not willing to trade, then no exchange takes place. Otherwise, the buyer
then makes a take-it-or-leave-it o¤er to the seller. This protocol in part allows us to
focus on the limited commitment friction, as take-it-or-leave-it o¤ers imply that there
will be no bargaining ine¢ ciencies.
When a buyer and seller are matched during the day, they continue to be matched
at the beginning of the following night, after which all agents enter the nighttime
Walrasian market.
1.4.1 Credit Equilibrium
Ultimately we will want to determine the role for valued money in this perfect-memory
economy, but our rst step will be to look at equilibria where money is not valued.
Here, the daytime take-it-or-leave-it o¤ers of buyers consist of credit contracts, with
a loan made during the day and repayment at night. We will conne attention to
stationary equilibria where sellers always choose to trade when they meet a buyer
during the day. Let l denote the loan quantity o¤ered by the buyer to the seller in the
day. Then, letting v denote the lifetime continuation utility of the buyer after repaying
9
the loan during the night, we have
v = max
l
[u(l)  l + v] (1.11)
subject to the incentive constraint
l  v   v^;
and
l  0:
Here, v^ is the buyers continuation utility if he or she defaults on the loan, which triggers
a punishment. In the equilibrium we consider here, v^ = 0; so that the punishment
for default is autarky for the defaulting buyer. On the o¤-equilibrium path, it is an
equilibrium for no one to trade with an agent who has defaulted as, if agent A trades
with agent B who has defaulted in the past, this triggers autarky for agent A. Here,
note that the individual punishment for a buyer who defaults is identical to a global
punishment whereby default by any buyer triggers global autarky. Letting  c(v) denote
the right-hand side of (3.9), we get
 c(v) = u(v); for 0  v  q;
and
 c(v) =  [u(q
)  q + v] ; for v  q:
An equilibrium is then a solution to v =  c(v): If q
 < q then there are two equilibria.
In the rst, v = 0; and in the second v > 0; which are both solutions to v = u(v): Note
that v is also the consumption of the buyer during the day, and of the seller during the
night, with v < q: In this case, the incentive constraint for the buyer binds in either
equilibrium. If q  q then the v = 0 equilibrium still exists, and the equilibrium






in which case consumption is q for any agent consuming at any date and the incentive
constraint does not bind.
Note that, in equilibrium, a seller meeting a buyer during the daytime is always
indi¤erent to trading or not. If he or she announces a willingness to trade, then the
buyer makes an o¤er that leaves the seller with zero surplus, and utility is identical to
what the seller would have achieved without trade. In the equilibrium we study, the
seller always chooses to trade.
In Figure 3, panel (b) shows the case where the incentive constraint binds in equi-
librium, and panel (a) the case where the incentive constraint does not bind. The
nonmonetary credit equilibrium, by virtue of the bargaining solution we use, just picks
out the e¢ cient stationary allocation that gives all of the surplus to the buyer.
1.4.2 Monetary Equilibrium
Assume that money is uniformly distributed across buyers at the beginning of the rst
day. Subsequently the government makes equal lump-sum transfers at the beginning
of the night to buyers, so that the money stock grows at the gross rate : Conne
attention to stationary monetary equilibria, and consider only cases where   ; as
otherwise a monetary equilibrium does not exist. Letm denote the real money balances
acquired by a buyer in the night, and  the real value of a lump-sum transfer received
by a buyer from the government during the night. Suppose that the buyer receives
the lump-sum transfer before acquiring money balances during the night, and continue
to let v denote the continuation utility for the buyer after receiving the lump-sum
transfer. As in Andolfatto (2008), we treat the government symmetrically with the
private sector, in that there is limited commitment with respect to tax liabilities as
well as private liabilities.
Continue to assume complete memory and, as in the previous subsection, default
by a buyer triggers autarky for that buyer. Since a seller will always be indi¤erent to
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trading with a buyer, sellers not only refuse to engage in credit contracts with a buyer
who has defaulted; they also refuse to take his or her money. Note that the trigger to
individual autarky is identical to a global punishment where, if an agent defaults, no
seller will trade with any buyer. With global punishment, the value of money is zero
on the o¤-equilibrium path.
















l   + v   v^
l  0:
Again, we have v^ = 0: Here, note that we need to be careful about the lump-sum
transfer the buyer receives. Should the buyer default on his or her debt, he or she
will also not receive the transfer, or will default on current and future tax liabilities if







For  > ; the right-hand side of equation (3.10) is given by








 v  v1;
 m(v) = u(v); for v1  v  q;
 m(v) =  [u(q

















For  = ; we have
 m(v) = [u(q








m 2 [q  min(q; v); q]:
Proposition 1 If q  q; then a monetary equilibrium does not exist if  6= :
Proof. If  < , a monetary equilibrium does not exist, for standard reasons.
Suppose  > . Dene the function   (v) = 	m (v)  v. Notice that   () is continuous
and limv!1   (v) =  1. Moreover,   (v) > 0 for all v 2 [max f0; (1  ) v1g ; q) and
  () is strictly decreasing on (q;1). Hence, there exists a unique value v  q such
that   (v) = 0. However, money is not valued in this equilibrium. Q.E.D.
Proposition 2 If q  q and  = ; then a continuum of monetary equilibria ex-









1  ): All of these equilibria yield
expected utility for the buyer of u(q
) q
1  :
Proof. Suppose  = . It follows that   () is continuous everywhere except possibly
at v = q and limv!1   (v) =  1. We have   (v) = u (q)   q > 0 for all v 2
[(1  ) q; q). At v = q we have   (q) = u (q)   q   (1  )m. A necessary
condition for the existence of a monetary equilibrium is   (q)  0, which requires
m  u (q
)  q
1   .










Given a positive value of m satisfying the inequality above, there exists a unique value
v  q such that   (v) = 0, in which case money is valued in equilibrium. Therefore,












All of these equilibria support the allocation (q; x) = (q; q). Q.E.D.
Proposition 3 If q < q; then a monetary equilibrium does not exist if  6= u0(q).
Proof. Suppose  > u0 (q). Notice that   (v) = u (v1)   v1 > 0 for all v 2
[max f0; (1  ) v1g ; v1),   (v) > 0 for all v 2 [v1; q), and   (q) < 0. Since   () is
continuous and strictly decreasing on (q;1), it follows that v = q is the unique
value satisfying   (v) = 0. Since v1 < q, it follows that money is not valued in
equilibrium. Suppose  2 (; u0 (q)). In this case,   (v) < 0 for all v  (1  ) v1,
so that a monetary equilibrium does not exist. Finally, assume  = . Again, we nd
that   (v) < 0 for all v  (1  ) q, so that a monetary equilibrium does not exist.
Q.E.D.
Proposition 4 If q < q and  = u0(q); then a continuum of monetary equilibria
exists with v 2 [q [1  u0 (q)] ; q): All of these equilibria yield expected utility for
the buyer of u(q
) q
1  :
Proof. Take  = u0(q). Then,   (v) = 0 for all v 2 [q [1  u0 (q)] ; q] and
  (v) < 0 for all v > q. Hence, a continuum of monetary equilibria exists with v 2
[q [1  u0 (q)] ; q). All of these equilibria yield the allocation (q; x) = (q; q).
Q.E.D.
If the money growth rate is su¢ ciently high, that is if  > max[1; u0(q)]; then
the rate of return on money is su¢ ciently low that money is not held in equilibrium.
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If q  q; it certainly seems clear why a monetary equilibrium will not exist when
the money growth rate is su¢ ciently high. In this case, when money is not valued a
credit equilibrium exists which is e¢ cient and incentive constraints do not bind. Thus,
there is clearly no role for money in equilibrium in relaxing incentive constraints in
decentralized trade. Why money is not valued even when q > q and  > u0(q)
is perhaps less clear. In this case, the only stationary equilibria that exist are the
two credit equilibria: one where v = 0 and one with v > 0 and binding incentive
constraints, as in Figure 3. Money cannot relax the binding incentive constraints, as
in order to support a money growth rate su¢ ciently low as to induce agents to hold
money, the government would have to impose su¢ ciently high taxes that buyers would
choose to default on their tax liabilities. Thus, there is no role for money in improving
e¢ ciency.
If  = max[1; u0(q)]; then in equilibrium buyers are essentially indi¤erent be-
tween using money and credit in decentralized transactions with sellers, and there
exist a continuum of equilibria with valued money. Each of these equilibria supports
the same allocation as does the credit equilibrium with v > 0: The continuum of equi-
libria is indexed by the quantity of real money balances held by buyers. Across these
equilibria, as the quantity of real balances rises, the quantity of lending falls.
Our results are consistent with the ideas in Kocherlakota (1998), as they should
be. With perfect memory, money is not socially useful. At best, money can be held in
equilibrium. This equilibrium is either one where incentive constraints do not bind and
the monetary authority follows a Friedman rule, or incentive constraints bind and the
money growth rule is similar to what Andolfatto (2008) nds. In either case, money
provides no e¢ ciency improvement.
15
1.5 Imperfect Memory and Autarkic Punishment
As we have seen, with perfect memory there is essentially no social role for money, and
it will only be held under special circumstances. As is well known, particularly given the
work of Kocherlakota, we need some imperfections in record-keeping in order for money
to be useful and to help it survive as a valued object. We will start by assuming that,
during the day, there is no memory in some bilateral meetings, and perfect memory
in other meetings. In particular, a fraction  of sellers has no monitoring potential,
while a fraction 1    does. In any day, a given buyer has probability  of meeting a
seller with no monitoring potential, in which case there is no memory in the interaction
between the buyer and seller. That is, each agent in such a meeting has no knowledge
of his or her trading partners history, and nothing about the meeting will be recorded.
With probability 1   a buyer meets a seller with monitoring potential. In this case,
the buyer has the opportunity to choose to have his or her interaction with the seller
monitored. Here, 0 <   1: If the buyer chooses a monitored interaction in the day,
then his or her history is observable to the seller, and the interaction between that
buyer and seller will be publicly observed during the day and through the beginning of
the following night. Otherwise, the buyers and sellers actions are unobserved during
the day and the following night.
Trade is carried out anonymously in the Walrasian market that opens in the latter
part of each night, in the sense that all that can be observed in the Walrasian market
is the market price. Individual actions are unobservable. Here, the case where  = 1 is
the standard one in monetary models with random matching such as Lagos and Wright
(2005). However, even in the case with  = 1; we deviate from the usual assumptions,
in that there is lack of commitment with respect to tax liabilities. We assume that
each agent can observe the interaction between the government and all other agents.
That is, default on tax liabilities is publicly observable.
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We change the bargaining protocol between a buyer and seller during the day as
follows. The buyer rst declares whether interactions with the seller during the period
will be monitored or not. If monitoring is chosen, then the seller learns the buyers
history of publicly-recorded transactions. Then, the seller decides whether or not to
transact with the buyer. If the seller is willing to transact, the buyer then makes a
take-it-or-leave-it o¤er.
Given our setup, if a buyer defaults on a loan made in a monitored trade, this will be
public information. As well, default by a buyer on tax liabilities is public information.
However, suppose that a seller were to make a loan to a buyer during the day in a non-
monitored trade, and then the buyer defaulted on the loan during the night. In this
case, it is impossible for that seller to signal to anyone else that default has occurred.
The interaction between the buyer and seller is private information, and the individual
seller cannot a¤ect prices in any subsequent nighttime Walrasian market. Further, in
the equilibria we study, a seller in a non-monitored trade during the day will never
have the opportunity to engage in a monitored trade during any subsequent day and
so will be unable to signal that a default has occurred.
1.5.1 Credit Equilibrium
First consider stationary equilibria where money is not valued, so that all exchanges
in the day market involve credit. Here, in the case where a buyer does not have the
opportunity to engage in a monitored transaction, there will be no exchange between
the buyer and the seller, as the buyer will be able to default and this will be private
information. Thus if money is not valued, then trade takes place during the day only in
monitored transactions, and the buyer will always weakly prefer to have the interaction









subject to the incentive constraint
l  v   v^;
and
l  0:
As in the previous section, v^ is the continuation value when punishment occurs, and
the punishment is autarky so v^ = 0. Now, letting c(v) denote the right-hand side of
(2.13), we can rewrite (2.13) as
v = c(v);
with
c(v) =  [(1  )u(v) + v] ; for 0  v  q
and
c(v) =  f(1  )[u(q)  q] + vg ; for v  q:




Proposition 5 If q < q then there are two credit equilibria, one where v = 0; and
one where the incentive constraint binds, l < q and v = q:
Proof. Dene  c (v) = c (v)  v. Note that  c () is continuous and limv!1  c (v) =
 1. Since q < q, it follows that  c (v) > 0 for all v 2 (0; q),  c (q) = 0, and
 c (v) < 0 for all v 2 (q;1). This implies that v = q is the unique positive value
satisfying  c (v) = 0. Since the incentive constraint binds, it follows that l = q in
such equilibrium. Q.E.D.
Proposition 6 If q  q then there are two credit equilibria, one where v = 0 and





Proof. In this case,  c (v) > 0 for all v 2 (0; q) and  c (q)  0. Note that  c () is
strictly decreasing on (q;1), with limv!1  c (v) =  1. Hence, there exists a unique
positive value v  q satisfying  c (v) = 0. This means that




1   [u (q
)  q] ,
and l = q is the amount consumed by the buyer in a monitored meeting during the
day. Q.E.D.
Now, since q < q for  > 0; imperfect memory limits credit market activity, just
as one might expect. Relative to the credit equilibrium with perfect memory there is
in general less trade in a credit equilibrium with imperfect memory, and the quantity
traded decreases as  increases. Of course, there is no credit market activity when
 = 1:
1.5.2 Monetary Equilibrium
As in the previous section, publicly observable default triggers autarky for the agent
who defaults. However, in this case autarkic punishment is carried out through a global
punishment whereby, if a single buyer defaults, this triggers an equilibrium where no
seller will trade during the day and therefore money is not valued.
Here, we solve for the equilibrium continuation value in a similar fashion to the

























l   + v   v^;
19
l  0:








Here, and in the rest of the paper, it will prove to be more straightforward to dene
an equilibrium and solve for it in terms of the consumption quantities for the buyer in
non-monitored and monitored trades, rather than solving for the continuation value v:
Therefore, let x be the daytime consumption of a buyer in the non-monitored state,
and y the buyers daytime consumption in the monitored state. Then in the problem
(2.14) above, we have m = x;  = x(  1); and l = y   x: Thus from (2.14), we can
solve for v in terms of x and y to get
v =  x+  f [u(x)  x] + (1  ) [u(y)  y]g
1   :
We can then dene an equilibrium in terms of x and y as follows.
Denition 1 A stationary monetary equilibrium is a pair (x; y), where x and y are
chosen optimally by the buyer,
u0 (x) + (1  )u0 (y) = 

, (1.16)
x and y have the property that consumptions and the loan quantity are nonnegative,
and consumptions do not exceed the surplus-maximizing quantity,
0  x  y  q, (1.17)
and (x; y) is incentive compatible,
 [u (x) + (1  )u (y)]  x  (1  ) y  (1  )v^, (1.18)
where y = q if (1.18) does not bind.
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Proposition 7 If q  q then a unique stationary monetary equilibrium exists for
  .
Proof. Suppose q  q  q. In this case, we cannot have an equilibrium with
a binding incentive constraint. Now, if the incentive constraint does not bind, then
y = q and
u0 (x) + 1   = 

. (1.19)
Note that (1  ) u (q)   (1  ) q  0, so that the incentive constraint is always
slack when y = q. Therefore, a unique stationary monetary equilibrium with a non-
binding incentive constraint exists for any   , with x dened by (1.19) and y = q.
Suppose q < q  q. First, assume the incentive constraint does not bind.
Then, there exists ~ >  such that
 [u (x)  x]    (1  ) u (q) + (1  ) q
if and only if  2 [; ~]. Again, a unique stationary monetary equilibrium with a
non-binding incentive constraint exists for  2 [; ~]. Let ~x be the value of x satisfying
(1.19) when  = ~. For  > ~, the incentive constraint binds, and a unique stationary
monetary equilibrium exists with (x; y) satisfying
 [u (x)  x] =   (1  ) u (y) + (1  ) y (1.20)
and
u0 (x) + (1  )u0 (y) = 

, (1.21)
where x < ~x and q < y < q. Q.E.D.
Proposition 8 If q < q then a unique stationary monetary equilibrium exists for
  u0(q):
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Proof. Note that we cannot have an equilibrium with a non-binding incentive
constraint because
 [u (x)  x] <   (1  ) u (q) + (1  ) q
when q < q. Then, (x; y) satisfy (1.20) and (1.21), with 0  x  y < q. Note that
(1.20) requires that y  q. Then, a unique stationary monetary equilibrium exists
for any   u0 (q). Q.E.D.
If q  q; which guarantees that q > q; as q < q; then the incentive
constraint does not bind for all   : In this case, the buyer consumes q in all
monitored trades where credit is used during the day, and consumes x in non-monitored
trades, where x  q and x is decreasing in : Therefore, the welfare of the buyer is
decreasing in ; while the seller receives zero utility in each period for all : Further,
when  = ; then x = y = q; in which case the loan quantity is l = y   x = 0; and
no credit is used. As  increases, then, the quantity of credit rises, that is credit is
substituted for money in transactions.
If q  q > q; then the incentive constraint binds for  > ~; where
 [u (~x)  ~x] =  (1  )u(q) + (1  )q
with ~x the solution to
u0 (~x) + 1   = ~

:
The incentive constraint does not bind for     ~: Here,  =  implies that
x = y = q and there is no credit, just as in the previous case. However, if the money
growth rate is su¢ ciently high, then the incentive constraint binds. If the incentive
constraint does not bind, then just as in the previous case y = q and x falls as  rises,
so that the welfare of buyers falls with an increase in  and credit is substituted for
money in transactions. If the incentive constraint binds, then it is straightforward to
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show that an increase in  causes both x and y to fall, with the loan quantity l = y x
increasing. Thus, as in the other cases, the welfare of buyers must fall as  rises, and
the use of credit rises with an increase in the money growth rate.
Finally, if q < q; then the incentive constraint will always bind in a stationary
monetary equilibrium. Here, when  = u0(q); then x = y = q and there is
no credit. Again, it is straightforward to show that x, y; and the welfare of buyers
decrease with an increase in ; and the quantity of lending rises.
Which case we get (the incentive constraint never binds; the incentive constraint
binds only for large money growth rates; the incentive constraint always binds) depends
on q  q:While q is independent of  and ; q is increasing in  and decreasing
in : Thus, the incentive constraint will tend to bind the lower is  and the higher is
: Higher  tends to relax incentive constraints for typical reasons. That is, as buyers
care more about the future, potential punishment is more e¤ective in enforcing good
behavior. Higher  implies that the imperfect memory friction becomes more severe,
and credit can be used with lower frequency. In general, monetary exchange will be less
e¢ cient than credit, and so a reduction in the frequency with which credit can be used
will tend to reduce the utility of a buyer in equilibrium. This will therefore reduce
the relative punishment to a buyer if he or she defaults and thus tighten incentive
constraints.
Proposition 9 If q  q; then  =  is optimal, and this implies that l = 0, the
incentive constraint does not bind, and the buyer consumes q in all trades during the
day.
Proof. Suppose the government treats buyers and sellers equally. Then, the govern-
ment chooses a money growth rate    to maximize  [u (x)  x]+(1  ) [u (y)  y]
subject to (2.16), (2.17), and (1.18). It follows that  =  implies x = y = q, and the
e¢ cient allocation under full commitment is implemented. Q.E.D.
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Proposition 10 If q < q; then  = u0(q) is optimal, and this implies that l = 0;
the incentive constraint binds, and the buyer consumes q in all trades during the day.
Proof. If q < q, the incentive constraint requires that y  q. It follows from
(1.20) and (1.21) that setting  = u0(q) implements the e¢ cient allocation (q; q).
Q.E.D.
Here, we have essentially generalized the results of Andolfatto (2008) to the case
where credit is permitted in some types of bilateral trades. If the discount factor is
su¢ ciently small, then the Friedman rule is not feasible and the incentive constraint
binds at the optimum. In terms of our goal of constructing a model with robust money
and credit, an undesirable feature of this setup is that optimal monetary policy drives
credit out of the economy. Here, the only ine¢ ciency in monetary exchange is due
to the fact that buyers in general hold too little real money balances in equilibrium,
and this ine¢ ciency can be corrected in the usual way, with the caveat that too much
deation can cause agents to default on their tax liabilities. Ultimately, at the optimum
money is equivalent to memory, in that an appropriate monetary policy achieves the
same allocation that could be achieved by a social planner with perfect recordkeeping.
1.6 Imperfect Memory and Non-Autarkic Punishment
In the previous section, given the limited commitment friction, optimal monetary policy
will yield an equilibrium allocation where credit is not used. Credit seems to be more
robust than this in practice, so we would like to study frictions that potentially imply
that money and credit coexist, even when monetary policy is e¢ cient.
Here, we will assume the same information technology and bargaining protocol
as in the previous section. However, we will consider a di¤erent equilibrium, where
default does not trigger autarky, but instead triggers an equilibrium where money is
valued. That is, a default results in reversion to an equilibrium where sellers will not
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trade if a buyer announces that he or she wishes the interaction to be monitored,
but will exchange goods for money if the buyer announces that the interaction will
not be monitored. The government is not able to commit to a monetary policy, so
the money growth rate that is chosen by the government when punishment occurs is
chosen optimally at that date given the behavior of private sector agents.
We restrict attention to punishment equilibria that are stationary. Further, a pun-
ishment equilibrium must be sustainable, in that no agent would choose to default on
his or her tax liabilities in such an equilibrium. Letting v^ denote the continuation value
in the punishment equilibrium, after agents receive their lump-sum transfers from the
government, we have














where m() is the quantity of real balances acquired by the buyer during the night,
















+ v^  v^; (1.23)
i.e. the equilibrium is sustained in the sense that, if an agent chooses not to accept
the transfer from the government, then the punishment is reversion to the punishment
equilibrium. Clearly, condition (1.23) implies that punishment equilibria are sustain-
able if and only if   1: That is, private agents need to be bribed to enforce the
punishment with positive transfers, otherwise they would default on the tax liabilities.
The government will choose  optimally in the punishment equilibrium, and it must
choose a sustainable money growth factor, i.e.   1: Assume that the government
weights the utility of buyers and sellers equally, though since sellers receive zero utility
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subject to (1.22) and   1: Clearly, the solution is  = 1; so we have
v^ =
 m^+ u(m^)






When punishment occurs, the government would like to have been able to commit to
an innite growth rate of the money supply so as to make the punishment as severe
as possible. However, given the governments inability to commit, once punishment is
triggered the government chooses the sustainable money growth rate that maximizes
welfare, consistent with the optimal punishment behavior of sellers in the credit market.
Thus, the money growth rate is set as low as possible without inducing default on tax
liabilities.
Now that we have determined the continuation value in a punishment equilibrium,
we can work backward to determine what the equilibrium can be. For this purpose, we
again dene the stationary equilibrium in terms of (x; y); where x denotes the daytime
consumption of a buyer in the non-monitored state, and y the buyers daytime con-
sumption in the monitored state. The denition of a stationary monetary equilibrium
is the same as in the previous section, except now v^ is dened by (1.24) and (1.25).
Proposition 11 The only monetary equilibrium is the punishment equilibrium.
Proof. First, suppose that y > x in equilibrium. Then, using Jensens inequality,
[u(x)+(1 )u(y)] x (1 )y < u [x+ (1  )y] x (1 )y   m^+u(m^);
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by virtue of (1.25). Thus, given that an equilibrium must satisfy (1.18), we have a
contradiction. Therefore, if an equilibrium exists, it must have y = x; in which case
inequality (1.18) can be written, using (1.24),
 x+ u(x)   m^+ u(m^);
but then by virtue of (1.25), (1.24) can only be satised, with equality, when x = y = m^;
and this can be supported, from (2.16), only if the money growth factor is  = 1:
Q.E.D.
Therefore, the only monetary equilibrium with non-autarkic punishment is one
where no credit is supported. The incentive constraint is satised with equality and no
seller is willing to lend to a borrower, even if the interaction is monitored. The optimal
money growth factor, indeed the only feasible money growth factor, is  = 1:
Intuition might tell us that, in line with some of the ideas in Aiyagari andWilliamson
(2000) and Antinol, Azariadis, and Bullard (2007), the possibility of being banned
from credit markets, but with punishment mitigated by the ability to trade money
for goods, would tend to promote credit. That is, because the degree of punishment
depends on money growth, the government might tend to produce ination so as to
increase the punishment for bad behavior in the credit market, thus reducing the payo¤
to holding money and causing buyers to substitute credit for money. In the context of
this model, this intuition is wrong, in part because we take account here of the govern-
ments role as a strategic player, and its inability to commit to inicting punishment.
Thus far, we have not arrived at a set of assumptions concerning the information
structure under which credit is robust. Either e¢ cient monetary policy will drive
credit out of the system, or the only equilibrium that exists is one without credit.
Thus, it appears that there must be another friction or frictions that are necessary to
the coexistence of robust money and credit that we observe in reality.
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1.7 Theft
One aspect of monetary exchange is that, due to anonymity, theft is easier in most
respects than it is with exchange using credit. It seems useful to consider a frame-
work where limited commitment makes credit arrangements di¢ cult, and theft makes
monetary exchange di¢ cult. However, the fact that theft makes monetary exchange
di¢ cult may lessen the limited commitment friction in the credit market, as this will
make default less enticing.
We will assume the same imperfect memory structure as in the previous section, but
allow for a technology that permits the theft of cash. Suppose the following bargaining
protocol. On meeting a seller in the daytime, the buyer rst announces whether his
or her interaction with the seller will be monitored or not. Recall that it is necessary
that the seller have the potential for monitoring (occurring with probability 1  from
the buyers point of view) in order for the interaction to be monitored. Then, the
seller announces whether or not he or she is willing to trade. Following this, if the
interaction is not monitored, the seller can pay a xed cost  to acquire a technology
(a gun), which permits him or her to conscate the buyers money, if the buyer has
any. Clearly, if the buyers money is stolen in a non-monitored trade, the interaction
with the seller ends there. Otherwise, the buyer makes a take-it-or-leave-it o¤er to the
seller if the seller has agreed to trade.
With theft, an equilibrium can be characterized by (x; y; ) where, as before, x is
consumption by the buyer in a non-monitored trade when theft does not occur, y is
consumption when monitored, and  is the fraction of non-monitored daytime meetings
where theft occurs, so that  2 [0; 1]: In general, given the continuation value v^ in the
punishment equilibrium, we can dene a monetary equilibrium as follows.
Denition 2 A monetary equilibrium is a triple (x; y; ); where x and y are chosen
optimally by the buyer,
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(1  )u0(x) + (1  )u0(y) = 

; (1.26)
x and y have the property that consumptions and the loan quantity are nonnegative,
and consumptions do not exceed the surplus-maximizing quantity,
0  x  y  q; (1.27)
(x; y; ) is incentive compatible,
[(1  )u(x) + (1  )u(y)]  x  (1  )y  v^(1  ); (1.28)
where y = q if (1.28) does not bind. Further, x and  must be consistent with optimal
theft by sellers in non-monitored trades, that is
if  = 0; then x   ; (1.29)
if 0 <  < 1; then x =  ; (1.30)
if  = 1; then x   : (1.31)
Conditions (1.29)-(1.31) state that in equilibrium there is either no theft, so sellers
must weakly prefer not to steal in non-monitored trades, or sellers sometimes steal, so
they must be indi¤erent to being honest, or sellers always steal, so they must weakly
prefer theft.
Now, the government will choose  so as to maximize welfare in equilibrium, where
the utilities of sellers and buyers are weighted equally. Thus, in the stationary equilibria
we study, the government wishes to maximize
W = (1  ) [u(x)  x] + (1  ) [u(y)  y]  
Lemma 12 When the government chooses  optimally,  = 0:
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Proof. First, suppose that there exists an equilibrium with  = 1, y = y < q and
x >  , supported by  = : Then from the denition of equilibrium, we can construct
another equilibrium with  < 1; y > y and x =  ; supported by some  > : In
this other equilibrium, W must be larger. If there exists an equilibrium with  = 1,
y < q and x =  in equilibrium, we can accomplish the same thing except by holding
x constant at  : Similarly if  = 1 and y = q the same argument applies except that
we do not increase y: Next, if 0 <  < 1 in equilibrium, we can construct another
equilibrium with lower ; larger ; and larger y if y < q which achieves higher welfare.
Q.E.D.
A smaller amount of theft necessarily increases the continuation value for the buyer
and relaxes the incentive constraint, while increasing welfare. A smaller amount of theft
can be achieved in this fashion as an equilibrium outcome with a higher money growth
rate. The higher money growth rate discourages the holding of currency, and therefore
reduces the payo¤ from theft. Note that this is true no matter what v^ is. Irrespective
of the punishment that is imposed when a buyer defaults, e¢ cient monetary policy
must always drive out theft.
1.7.1 Autarkic Punishment
First, consider the case where default triggers autarky. In determining what is optimal
for the government in this context, we know from the above arguments that we can
restrict attention to equilibria where  = 0; and search among these equilibria for the
one that yields the highest welfare. The government then solves the following problem:
max
x;y;
f [u(x)  x] + (1  ) [u(y)  y]g (1.32)
subject to




x   (1.34)
0  x  y  q (1.35)
[u(x) + (1  )u(y)]  x  (1  )y  0; (1.36)
where y = q if the last constraint does not bind. We rst have the following results.
Proposition 13 If q  q and   q; then a Friedman rule is optimal, and this
supports an e¢ cient allocation in equilibrium.
Proof. Suppose that we ignore the constraint (1.34) in the governments optimization
problem. If q  q; then the solution to the problem is x = y = q and  = ; i.e.
the solution is what we obtained when we studied non-autarkic punishment with the
same setup and no theft technology. However, for the constraint (1.34) not to bind at
the optimum then requires   q: Q.E.D.
Proposition 14 If q > q and   q; then  = u0(q) at the optimum, and this
supports an e¢ cient allocation in equilibrium.
Proof. Again, suppose that we ignore the constraint (1.34) and solve the govern-
ments optimization problem in the case where q > q: Then the solution to the
problem is x = y = q and  = u0(q); i.e. the solution is what we obtained when
we studied non-autarkic punishment with the same setup and no theft technology.
Now, for the constraint (1.34) not to bind at the optimum requires   q: Q.E.D.
Thus, as should be obvious, if the cost of theft is su¢ ciently large that theft does
not take place in equilibrium given the e¢ cient monetary policy rules we derived in
the absence of theft, then theft is irrelevant for policy. Of course, our interest is in
what happens when theft is su¢ ciently lucrative, i.e. when  is su¢ ciently small that
(1.34) binds at the optimum.
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Now, since x =  at the optimum when theft matters, this makes solving the
governments optimization problem easy. First, suppose that q  q  q in which
case theft matters if and only if   q: Then (x; y) = ( ; q) must be optimal, as this
satises (1.36) as a strict inequality, (1.35) is satised, and we can recover the money
growth factor that supports this as an equilibrium from (1.33), i.e.
 =  [u0() + 1  ] : (1.37)
Note that the optimal money growth rate rises as the cost of theft falls, as a lower
cost of theft requires a higher money growth rate to drive out theft. An interesting
feature of the e¢ cient equilibrium is that money and credit now coexist. Indeed, the
loan quantity is l = q    , which increases as the cost of theft decreases. Essentially,
money and credit act as substitutes. As the theft friction gets more severe, money
becomes more costly to hold at the optimum (the optimal money growth rate rises),
and buyers use credit more intensively.
Now, suppose that q < q  q in which case theft matters if and only if   q:
Let  < q be the unique value of  satisfying
 [u ()   ] + (1  )u(q)  (1  )q = 0:
Then, for  2 (0;  ] the incentive constraint binds, and the optimal equilibrium alloca-
tion is (x; y) = ( ; y); where y is the solution to
 [u ()   ] + (1  )u(y)  (1  )y = 0: (1.38)
The optimal money growth factor in this case is
 =  [u0() + (1  )u0(y)] : (1.39)
For  2 [ ; q]; the incentive constraint does not bind, and the optimal equilibrium
allocation is (x; y) = ( ; q) with the optimal money growth factor given by
 =  [u0() + 1  ] :
32
Clearly, given q < q  q; x and y both decrease as  decreases, at the optimum, so
that the welfare of buyers falls. Further, it is straightforward to show that the quantity
of lending, y x increases as  falls, at the optimum, so that less costly theft promotes
credit. As well, the optimal money growth factor decreases as the cost of theft rises.
Finally, consider the case where q > q; in which case theft matters if and only if
  q: Here, the incentive constraint always binds, and (x; y) = ( ; y); where y is the
solution to (1.38), and the optimal money growth factor is given by (1.39). Just as in
the other cases, x and y fall as  falls, at the optimum, and welfare decreases. As well,
the quantity of lending rises as  falls at the optimum.
1.7.2 Non-Autarkic Punishment
Recall that, with non-autarkic punishment we are looking for a sustainable punishment
equilibrium in which, if a buyer meets a seller and announces that the interaction will
be monitored, the seller will not trade. Money will be valued in the punishment
equilibrium, but all transactions between buyers and sellers will be non-monitored
ones. The government cannot commit to a monetary policy rule, so when default
occurs the government will choose the money growth factor that maximizes welfare in
the punishment equilibrium.
Through arguments identical to what we used previously when theft was not an
issue, any sustainable punishment equilibrium must have   1; as buyers need to be
bribed with a transfer to sustain the punishment. Note that we cannot have  = 1
in the punishment equilibrium since, if all sellers steal, no buyer would accumulate
money balances, but if no buyer accumulates money balances there will be no theft.
Let x denote the buyers daytime consumption in the punishment equilibrium. Then,
the punishment equilibrium is the solution to the following problem.
max
x;;
(1  ) [u(x)  x]  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subject to
(1  )u0(x) = 

0  x  q
 2 [0; 1)
  1
if  = 0; then x  
if  > 0; then x = 
Now, just as in the e¢ cient equilibrium, it is straightforward to show that part of the
solution to this problem is  = 0: That is, if there is a sustainable equilibrium where
 > 0; then there is another equilibrium with a higher money growth factor, lower
; and higher welfare that is also sustainable. Given that  = 0 is optimal (no theft
in the punishment equilibrium), the government will choose the lowest money growth
rate consistent with sustainability and no theft. Therefore, the solution to the above
problem is
If u0()  1; then x = m^,  = 1; and v^ = u(m^)  m^
1  
If u0() > 1; then x =  ,  = u0(); and v^ =
 f  [(1  )u0() + 1] + u()g
1  
Here, recall that u0(m^) = 1

:
Now, suppose that u0()  1; that is   m^: Then, given the same arguments as we
used in the absence of the theft technology, the only incentive compatible equilibrium
allocation is x = y = m^ and  = 1: Since   m^; this is an equilibrium where there is
only monetary exchange and no theft. It is identical to what we obtained when there
was no theft technology.
The interesting case is the one where u0() > 1; or  < m^: Here, in a manner
similar to what we did in the last subsection, we are looking for an e¢ cient equilibrium
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that is the solution to the governments problem:
max
x;y;
f [u(x)  x] + (1  ) [u(y)  y]g (1.40)
subject to
u0(x) + (1  )u0(y) = 

; (1.41)
x   (1.42)
0  x  y  q (1.43)
 [u(x)  x] + (1  )u(y)  (1  )y   f  [(1  )u0() + 1] + u()g : (1.44)
Lemma 15 If u0() > 1; then with non-autarkic punishment, x =  in an e¢ cient
equilibrium.
Proof. Suppose not. Then, an increase in x will relax constraint (1.44), since  < m^:
Therefore if there exists an equilibrium with x <  and y = q; there exists another
equilibrium with larger x and smaller  such that the constraints in the above problem
are all satised and the value of the objective function increases. Similarly, if there
exists an equilibrium with x <  and y < q; so that (1.44) holds with equality, then we
can construct another equilibrium satisfying all of the constraints in the problem and
increase the value of the objective function, simply because increasing x relaxes the
incentive constraint and increases the value of the objective function, and we can nd a
value for  that satises (1.41) and therefore supports this allocation as an equilibrium.
Q.E.D.
Given the above lemma, we can write the incentive constraint (1.44) as
(1  )u(y)  (1  )y  (1  )[u()   ]  (1  )u0() (1.45)
Now, let y() denote the value of y satisfying (1.45), given  ; where y() = q if (1.45)
does not bind. The function y() is dened for  2 [0; m^]: We know that y(0) = q
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and y(m^) = m^: Therefore, for example, if q > m^; then by continuity there are some
values of  for which a reduction in  causes an increase in y: That is, a decrease
in the cost of theft can increase the quantity of consumption in the monitored state,
which makes this case much di¤erent from the one where the punishment equilibrium
is autarky. It is straightforward to show that, if u0() > 1; and y =  ; then (1.45)
is satised as a strict inequality, so that y() >  for  2 [0; m^): Thus, as long as
theft matters, an e¢ cient equilibrium supports some credit, just as in the autarkic
punishment case. Finally, the optimal money growth rate will be given by
 =  fu0() + (1  )u0 [y()]g < u0():
With non-autarkic punishment, theft acts as a disciplining device. The opportuni-
ties are greater for thieves in the punishment equilibrium, since all exchange is carried
out using money. Thus, the government needs to inate at a higher rate in order
to drive out thieves, which makes the punishment more severe. The e¢ cient money
growth rate is always smaller than it is in the punishment equilibrium. Therefore,
buyers who default not only give up access to credit markets, but they will have to
face a higher ination tax.
1.8 Conclusion
In determining the roles for money and monetary policy, it is important to analyze
models with credit. Credit and outside money are typically substitutes in making
transactions, and an important aspect of the e¤ects of monetary policy may have to
do with how central bank intervention works through credit market relationships. In
the model studied in this paper, limited memory provides a role for money, as in much
of the recent monetary theory literature, and does this by reducing the role for credit.
This role for credit is further mitigated by limited commitment.
In this context, monetary policy works too well, in the sense that e¢ cient monetary
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policy drives out credit. In reality, money and credit appear to be robust, in that it is
hard to imagine an economy where there are not some transactions carried out with
both money and credit. To obtain this robustness in our environment, it is necessary
that there be some cost to operating the monetary system. The cost we choose to
model is theft, as we think that theft, or the threat of theft, is likely an empirically
signicant cost associated with monetary exchange. If the cost of theft is small enough
to matter, then money and credit always coexist under an optimal monetary policy,
and a reduction in the cost of theft acts to increase lending in the economy, though
this depends to some extent on how bad behavior in the credit market is punished. In
general, the Friedman rule is not optimal given theft, and the optimal money growth
rate tends to increase as the cost of theft falls.
For convenience, we have modeled monetary intervention by the central bank as
occurring through lump-sum transfers. Though we have not shown this in the paper, we
think that the results are robust to how money injections occur. For example, it should
not matter if money is injected through central bank lending or open market purchases.
In the latter case, of course, we would have to take a stand on why government bonds
are not used in transactions.
This model should be useful for evaluating the performance of monetary policy
in the context of aggregate shocks. As well we could easily consider other types of
costs of operating a monetary system, including counterfeiting, the costs of deterring
counterfeiting, or the costs of replacing worn currency.
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2 Unsecured Loans and The Initial Cost of Lending
2.1 Introduction
The cost of starting a credit relationship has fallen signicantly over the last few
decades. For instance, Mester (1997) points out that the use of credit scoring has
reduced signicantly the time and cost in the loan approval process. Barron and Staten
(2003) and Berger (2003) provide evidence suggesting that advances in information
technology have signicantly reduced the cost of processing information for lenders.
An important question that needs to be addressed is the following. What is the impact
of changes in the cost of starting a credit relationship on the supply of credit? Drozd
and Nosal (2008) argue that such a drop in the initial cost of lending can account
for several facts in the market for unsecured loans such as the signicant increase
in revolving lines of credit over the last two decades. To derive these results, they
introduce a search friction into an incomplete markets model in which the terms of the
contract o¤ered by a lender are xed. In a recent paper, Livshits, MacGee, and Tertilt
(2009) also use an incomplete markets model to analyze the e¤ect of technological
progress on consumer credit.
Although both models are successful in reproducing some stylized facts of the mar-
ket for unsecured loans, it is crucial to adopt a more fundamental approach by not
restricting the space of contracts that can be o¤ered by a lender in a competitive
credit market. In this way, we can clearly analyze how changes in the initial cost of
lending a¤ect the endogenous credit contract o¤ered by lenders. This is an essential
aspect of the analysis because the dynamics of long-term credit arrangements is an
important property of any model of credit. We emphasize precisely how changes in the
initial cost of lending a¤ect the dynamics of a credit relationship.
In this paper, we study the impact of changes in the cost of starting a credit
relationship on the terms of the contract in a decentralized credit market where sellers
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are willing to repeatedly nance the purchases of buyers by extending direct credit.
Our approach is consistent with the endogenously incomplete markets literature see
Sleet (2008) where trading arrangements are derived from primitive frictions instead
of assumed. The frictions we choose to model are the following. First, the environment
is such that lenders are asymmetrically informed about a borrowers ability to repay
a loan. Second, lenders can commit to some credit contracts while borrowers cannot
commit to any contract. Third, transactions within each credit relationship are not
publicly observable, which captures the idea that information is dispersed in the market
for unsecured loans. Fourth, it is costly for a lender to contact a borrower in the credit
market as in Drozd and Nosal (2008) and Livshits, MacGee, and Tertilt (2009). Given
these frictions, we derive the terms of the contract that lenders o¤er to borrowers in a
competitive credit market.
We build on the model of perfect competition by Phelan (1995). In his model, there
is a particular mechanism for price formation in the credit market: lenders post the
terms of the contract. One important di¤erence is that we assume that lenders need to
pay a one-shot cost to make a contact with a borrower in the credit market. This cap-
tures the idea that it is costly to start a credit relationship. Another crucial di¤erence
in our model is that we make the ow of payments associated with a credit contract
explicit within each period as opposed to net transfers. One important characteristic
of a credit transaction is that settlement takes place at a future date: each transaction
between a buyer and a seller necessarily creates a liability to the buyer that needs to be
settled some time in the future. In an environment where buyers (borrowers) cannot
commit to repay their loans, this results in ex post individual rationality constraints.
Making the ow of payments explicit allows us to clearly characterize how the loan
amounts within an enduring credit relationship evolve over time.
As in Phelan (1995), we assume that lenders can commit to deliver some credit
41
contracts while borrowers cannot commit to any contract. The main di¤erence from
Phelans work is that we assume that, although lenders can commit to deliver a long-
term credit contract, they cannot commit to contracts that at any date result in a
payo¤ that is lower than that associated with autarky. This assumption, together with
the assumption that it is costly for lenders to contact borrowers, changes signicantly
the equilibrium outcome. If the initial cost of lending is positive, a borrowers expected
discounted utility uctuates over time as a result of variable terms of credit within an
enduring relationship. As the cost approaches zero, the equilibrium credit contract
converges to a full-insurance contract.
A lower cost of starting a relationship has the following impact on the equilibrium
outcome: (i) each borrower is better o¤from the perspective of the contracting date; (ii)
a borrowers expected discounted utility uctuates within a smaller set; and (iii) each
lender is uniformly worse o¤ ex post. A lower cost of entry in the credit market leads
to more competition among lenders, which in turn results in better terms of credit
for each borrower. Another implication is that the terms of the contract are such
that a borrowers expected discounted utility has less variability over time. Although
the terms of credit change over time according to the history of trades, the loan and
repayment amounts specied in a lenders contract are such that the space of expected
discounted utilities for a borrower shrinks when the initial cost of lending falls. Finally,
a lenders cost function under an entry cost of k0 < k is uniformly above a lenders cost
function under the cost k, which necessarily means that lenders are uniformly worse
o¤ ex post.
The model in this paper relates to decentralized models of credit, such as Diamond
(1990), Temzelides and Williamson (2001), Nosal and Rocheteau (2006), Koeppl, Mon-
net, and Temzelides (2008), and Andolfatto (2008), as opposed to centralized models of
credit, such as Kehoe and Levine (1993) and Alvarez and Jermann (2000). The model
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also builds on search-theoretic models of money, such as Shi (1997) and Lagos and
Wright (2005). However, we depart from these models by weakening the assumption
that agents cannot engage in enduring relationships. Finally, the analysis builds on dy-
namic contracting. Important papers in this literature include Green (1987), Thomas
and Worrall (1990), Atkeson and Lucas (1992, 1995), Kocherlakota (1996), Aiyagari
and Williamson (1999), and Krueger and Uhlig (2006).
2.2 The Model
Time is discrete and continues forever, and each period has two subperiods. There are
two types of agents, referred to as borrowers and lenders. In the rst subperiod, a
lender is able to produce the unique perishable consumption good but does not want
to consume, and a borrower wants to consume but cannot produce. In the second
subperiod, we have the opposite situation: a borrower is able to produce but does not
want to consume, and a lender wants to consume but cannot produce. Production and
consumption takes place within each subperiod. This generates a double coincidence
of wants and, for this reason, we refer to the rst subperiod as the transaction stage
and to the second subperiod as the settlement stage. The types (borrower and lender)
refer to the agents role in the transaction stage. The production technology allows
each agent to produce one unit of the good with one unit of labor. Each agent receives
an endowment of h > 0 units of time in each subperiod.
A lenders utility in period t is given by  qlt + xlt, where qlt is production of the
good in the transaction stage and xlt is consumption of the good in the settlement
stage. A borrowers momentary utility from consuming qbt units of the consumption




. Assume that u : R+ ! D  R is
increasing, strictly concave, and continuously di¤erentiable. Let H denote the inverse
of u, and let wa  u (0) denote the value associated with autarky. Producing ybt units
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of the good in the settlement stage generates utility  ybt for a borrower. However,
there is a friction that a¤ects a borrowers ability to produce goods in the settlement
stage. With probability  a borrower is unable to produce the consumption good and
with probability 1    a borrower can produce the good using the linear production
technology. This productivity shock is independently and identically distributed over
time. Each borrower learns his productivity shock at the beginning of the settlement
stage, which is privately observed. Finally, let  2 (0; 1) be the common discount
factor over periods.
Suppose that there is a large number of borrowers and lenders, with the set of
lenders su¢ ciently large. There is a one-shot cost k > 0 in terms of the consumption
good for a lender to post a credit contract in the credit market. A contract species
consumption and production by each party as a function of the available information.
Each lender can have at most one borrower it is innitely costly for a lender to contact
two borrowers at the same time. Only the agents in a bilateral meeting observe the
history of trades. Other agents in the economy observe a break in a particular match
but do not observe the history of trades in that match. Notice that there are gains
from trade since a lender can produce the consumption good for a borrower in the rst
subperiod (transaction stage) and a borrower can produce the good for a lender in the
second subperiod (settlement stage). An important feature of the model is that, with
probability , a borrower is unable to produce the good in the second subperiod and
settle his debt. This is equivalent to assuming that the settlement process involves a
friction.
2.3 Equilibrium
In this section, we study an equilibrium allocation under a particular pricing mecha-
nism: price posting by lenders. To enter the credit market, a lender needs to post a
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contract to attract a borrower and start a credit relationship. Although it is costly
for a lender to make a contact with a borrower, there is free entry of lenders in the
credit market. We characterize the terms of the contract in each credit relationship
in the economy and restrict attention to a symmetric, stationary equilibrium in which
each borrower receives a market-determined credit contract o¤ered by a lender that
promises him expected discounted utility w, from the perspective of the contracting
date. Each lender needs to provide incentives to induce the desired behavior by a
borrower given that a borrowers ability to repay a loan is not publicly observable.
We assume that lenders can commit to some credit contracts while borrowers cannot
commit to any contract. Specically, each lender can commit to deliver any contract
that does not result at any moment in an expected discounted utility that is lower than
that associated with autarky recall that a lender has always the option of remaining
inactive. On the other hand, borrowers cannot commit to any contract and can walk
away from a credit relationship at any moment without any pecuniary punishment. As
we will see, a lenders optimal contract results in a long-term relationship from which
neither party wants to deviate.
The expected discounted utility w associated with the market contract must be
such that it makes each lender indi¤erent between entering the credit market by post-
ing a contract and remaining inactive, from the perspective of the contracting date.
As a result, some lenders post a contract and successfully match with a borrower while
others do not post a contract and remain inactive. When o¤ering her own contract,
each lender takes as given the contracts o¤ered by the other lenders. The only relevant
characteristic about these contracts is the expected discounted utility w that each
borrower associates with them. This is the utility that a borrower obtains by accept-
ing a lenders contract, from the perspective of the signing date. The equilibrium is
symmetric because every active lender o¤ers the same credit contract.
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The market contract must always result in an expected discounted utility for a
borrower that is greater than or equal to w. If the market contract promises, in a
given period, an expected discounted utility w0 for a borrower which is less than w,
the latter can do better by reneging on his current contract and starting a new credit
relationship with another lender. Recall that inactive lenders observe the dissolution
of a credit relationship and may be willing to enter the credit market. Given that there
is free entry of lenders and limited commitment, we can have an equilibrium only if
the lowest promised expected discounted utility at any moment is exactly w.
2.3.1 Recursive Formulation of the Contracting Problem
A contract species in every period a transfer of the good from the lender to the
borrower in the transaction stage and a repayment a transfer of the good from the
borrower to the lender in the settlement stage as a function of the available history
of reports by the borrower. These are reports about a borrowers ability to produce
goods in the settlement stage. Let t 1 =
 
0; 1; :::; t 1
 2 f0; 1gt denote a partial
history of reports, where  = 0 means that a borrower is unable to produce the good
in the settlement stage of period  and  = 1 means that he is able to produce it in
the settlement stage of period  .
In equilibrium, each active lender chooses to o¤er a long-term contract, which means
that she matches with a borrower at the rst date and keeps him in the credit rela-
tionship forever. The long-term contract species quantities produced and transferred
within each subperiod. We say that in each period t there is a transaction between a
borrower and a lender which consists of a loan amount from the lender to the borrower
in the rst subperiod (transaction stage) and a repayment amount in the second sub-
period (settlement stage) contingent on the report of the productive state of nature
(t = 1).
The optimal contracting problem has a recursive formulation in which we can use
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a borrowers expected discounted utility w 2 D as the state variable. The optimal
contract minimizes the expected discounted cost for a lender of providing expected
discounted utility w to a borrower subject to incentive compatibility. Let C(w; w) :
[w; w]! R denote the expected discounted cost for a lender that satises the following
functional equation:
C(w; w) (w) = min
'2(w; w)(w)

(1  ) [H (u)  (1  ) y1] +


C(w; w) (w0) + (1  )C(w; w) (w1)
  . (2.1)
Here, the choices are given by ' = (u; y1; w0; w1), where u denotes a borrowers mo-
mentary utility of consumption in the transaction stage, y1 denotes his production in
the settlement stage given that he is able to produce the good, and w denotes his
promised expected discounted utility at the beginning of the following period given
that his report in the current period is  2 f0; 1g. Recall that  = 0 means that a bor-
rower is unable to produce the good in the settlement stage and  = 1 means that he is
able to produce it. The constraint set (w; w) (w) consists of all ' inD[0; h][w; w]2
satisfying a borrowers individual rationality constraints,
w0  w, (2.2)
  (1  ) y1 + w1  w, (2.3)
a borrowers truth-telling constraint,
  (1  ) y1 + w1  w0, (2.4)
and the promise-keeping constraint,
(1  ) [u  (1  ) y1] +  [w0 + (1  )w1] = w. (2.5)
It can be shown that, for any xed lower bound w and upper bound w, there exists
a unique continuously di¤erentiable, strictly increasing, and strictly convex function
C(w; w) : [w
; w] ! R satisfying the functional equation (3.1). Let u^ : [w; w] ! D,
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y : [w; w] ! [0; h], and g : [w; w]  f0; 1g ! [w; w] denote the associated policy
functions, which can be shown to be continuous and bounded.
Given our transformation of the state space, a borrowers expected discounted util-
ity w now summarizes the partial history of reports. As mentioned before, the terms
of credit for the current transaction are given by fH [u^ (w)] ; y (w)g. The quantity
H [u^ (w)] gives the loan amount from the lender to the borrower in the transaction
stage, and the quantity y (w) gives the repayment amount in the settlement stage con-
tingent on the report of the productive state of nature. Both quantities depend on
w.
Notice that a lender cannot commit to a contract that gives her at any moment an
expected discounted utility that is lower than that associated with autarky. As a result,
individual rationality for a lender requires that C(w; w) (w)  0 holds for all w 2 [w; w].
I show next that, for any given w, there exists an upper bound w = w (w) on the
set of expected discounted utilities that gives the highest promised expected utility to
which a lender can commit to deliver given that the lowest expected utility that can be
promised is w. As we will see later, the market utility w is determined endogenously
and is such that it makes each lender indi¤erent between entering the credit market
by posting a contract and remaining inactive.
Lemma 16 For any w  wa such that C(w;w) (w)  0, there exists an upper bound
w (w) on the set of expected discounted utilities such that C(w; w(w)) [ w (w)] = 0.
Proof. Let wF denote the expected discounted utility such that the expected dis-
counted cost of providing wF given full information equals zero. Dene the function
 : [w; wF ]! [w; wF ] as follows. For any given w 2 [w; wF ], if there is no w0 2 [w; w]
such that C(w;w) (w0) = 0, then  (w) = w. Otherwise,  (w) equals the highest point
w0 in [w; w] for which C(w;w) (w0) = 0. Notice that C(w;w) (w)  0 by assumption,
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which implies that  (w) = w. For any other w such that  ( w) = w, it must be that
C(w; w) ( w) = 0.
Now, construct a sequence fwtg1t=0 of candidates for the upper bound w in the
following way. Let w0 = wF . We have that C(w;w0) (w0)  0, with strict inequality if
the truth-telling constraint (3.3) binds. Also, notice that (w;w) (w)  (w;w0) (w),
which implies that C(w;w0) (w
)  C(w;w) (w)  0. The rst inequality is strict if
the truth-telling constraint binds. Continuity implies that there exists w1 2 [w; w0]
such that C(w;w0) (w1) = 0. This means that w1 =  (w0)  w0. We proceed in
the same fashion to dene w2. From the fact that C(w;w0)  C(w;w1), it follows that
C(w;w1) (w1)  C(w;w0) (w1) = 0. Given that (w;w) (w)  (w;w1) (w), we have
that C(w;w1) (w
)  C(w;w) (w)  0. Again, continuity implies that there exists
w2 2 [w; w1] such that C(w;w1) (w2) = 0. This means that w2 =  (w1)  w1. Notice
then that fwtg1t=0 is a non-increasing sequence on a closed interval. As a result, it
converges to a point w1 in the interval [w; wF ]. The Theorem of the Maximum
guarantees that  (w)  C(w;w) (w) moves continuously, which implies that w1 is the
highest xed point of  . Q.E.D.
To ease notation, dene Cw (w)  C(w; w(w)) (w) and Dw  [w; w (w)]. Given
that Cw (w) is strictly increasing in w, it follows that Cw (w)  0 for all w in the set
Dw. This means that, for any given lower bound w, Dw gives the set of promised
expected discounted utilities that are actually incentive-feasible. If the truth-telling
constraint binds, then it follows that w (w) > w for any lower bound w satisfying
C(w;w) (w
)  0. I show next that the truth-telling constraint indeed binds for any
w in Dw. But rst notice that the truth-telling constraint (3.3), together with the
constraint 0  y (w)  h, implies that g (w; 1)  g (w; 0) for all w 2 Dw, which
means that the optimal contract needs to assign a higher promised expected discounted
utility to a borrower contingent on the realization of the productive state of nature to
49
e¤ectively induce truthful reporting.
Lemma 17 The truth-telling constraint (3.3) binds for any w 2 Dw.
Proof. Suppose that
  (1  ) y1 + w1 > w0 (2.6)
holds at the optimum. This implies that
  (1  ) y1 + w1 > w (2.7)
must also hold at the optimum. Now, reduce the left-hand side of (3.4) and (3.5) by a
small amount  > 0 so that both inequalities continue to hold. Dene w01 = w1   
and w00 = w0 + (1  ). Notice that w00 + (1  )w01 = w0 + (1  )w1 and
w01   w00 < w1   w0. The strict convexity of Cw implies that
Cw (w
0
0) + (1  )Cw (w01) < Cw (w0) + (1  )Cw (w1) ,
so that the value of the objective function on the right-hand side of (3.1) falls. Since
all constraints continue to be satised, this implies a contradiction. Q.E.D.
An immediate consequence of the previous result is that w < w (w) for any given
w such that C(w;w) (w)  0.
2.3.2 Existence and Uniqueness of Stationary Equilibrium
Now, we need to ensure that there exists a market-determined expected discounted
utility w associated with a market contract that makes each lender indi¤erent between
posting a contract and remaining inactive. This is equivalent to showing the existence
of an equilibrium.
Formally, a stationary and symmetric equilibrium consists of a cost function Cw :
Dw ! R, policy functions u^ : Dw ! D, y : Dw ! [0; h], g : Dw  f0; 1g ! Dw, and a
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market utility w such that: (i) Cw satises (3.1); (ii) (u^; y; g) are the optimal policy
functions for (3.1); and (iii) w satises the free-entry condition:
Cw (w
) + (1  ) k = 0. (2.8)
The market utility w gives the expected discounted utility for a borrower at the signing
date. Due to limited commitment and free entry of lenders in the credit market, it is
also the lower bound on the set of expected discounted utilities.
Lemma 18 There exists a unique expected discounted utility w satisfying (3.6) pro-
vided that k > 0 is su¢ ciently small.
Proof. First, notice that Cwa (wa) < 0 < C wF ( wF ). Suppose that k > 0 is su¢ ciently
small such that Cwa (wa)+(1  ) k < 0. Given that ^ (w)  Cw (w) is continuous in w,
there exists w 2 [wa; wF ] such that ^ (w)+(1  ) k = 0. To show uniqueness, dene
the mapping  : [wa; wF ]! [wa; wF ] as follows. If Cw+(1  ) k is always greater than
zero on [w; wF ], then  (w) = wa. Otherwise,  (w) equals the point w0 2 [w; wF ] for
which Cw (w0)+ (1  ) k = 0. We claim that  is a non-increasing function. To verify
this claim, we need to show rst that w (w) is non-increasing in w. Fix a lower bound
w0 in the set [wa; wF ], and consider the associated upper bound w (w0). Take another
point w00 > w0 in the set [wa; w (w0)]. Notice that C(w0; w(w0))  C(w00; w(w0)). Thus, we
have that C(w00; w(w0)) [ w (w0)]  0 given that C(w0; w(w0)) [ w (w0)] = 0 by the denition
of w (w0). This implies that w (w00)  w (w0), and we conclude that w (w) is indeed
non-increasing in w. The fact that w (w) is non-increasing then implies that raising
the lower bound w only tightens the constraint set (w; w(w)) (). As a result, the point
at which Cw + (1  ) k equals zero is a non-increasing function of the lower bound w,
which means that  can have at most one xed point. Q.E.D.
Notice that ex ante each lender gets zero expected discounted utility by posting a
contract. Ex post a lender gets a higher utility, given that Cw (w) < 0. Moreover,
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as the contract is executed, there is no history of reports by a borrower that gives a
lender an expected discounted utility that is lower than that associated with autarky.
For this reason, neither a lender nor a borrower nds it optimal to renege on the credit
contract.
2.3.3 Properties of the Optimal Contract
We can rewrite the optimization problem on the right-hand side of (3.1) in the following
way. The relevant constraints for the optimization problem are (3.2),
  (1  ) y1 + w1 = w0, (2.9)
and
(1  ) (u  y1) + w1 = w. (2.10)
Substituting (3.7) and (3.8) into (3.1), the optimization problem now consists of choos-






1   + y1













subject to w  w1  w (w), 0  y1  h, and
w1   (1  )

y1  w. (2.11)
The rst-order conditions for the optimal choice of y1 are
H 0

w   g (w; 1)
1   + y (w)

  C 0w [g (w; 0)] +
 (w)

 1  , (2.12)
if y (w) < h, and
H 0

w   g (w; 1)
1   + y (w)

  C 0w [g (w; 0)] +
 (w)

 1  , (2.13)
if y (w) > 0. The rst-order condition for the optimal choice of w1 is
H 0

w   g (w; 1)




C 0w [g (w; 0)]+




with equality if g (w; 1) < w (w). Also, we have that
 (w)






where  (w)  0 is the Lagrange multiplier on constraint (3.9). Finally, the envelope
condition is given by
C 0w (w) = H
0

w   g (w; 1)
1   + y (w)

, (2.16)
for any value of w in the interior of the set Dw.
Now, we establish some properties of the optimal continuation value g (w; ) for
each  2 f0; 1g. These give a borrowers expected discounted utility at the beginning
of the following period associated with the market contract as a function of his initially
promised expected discounted utility w and his report in the settlement stage of the
current period. If a borrowers expected discounted utility falls in the subsequent
period relative to the current period, this means that the terms of the contract become
less favorable for him - and as a result more favorable for the lender.
Lemma 19 g (w; 1)  w for all w 2 Dw.
Proof. Suppose that g (w; 1) < w for some w in the interior of Dw. Given that
g (w; 1) < w  w (w), it must be that
C 0w (w) = C
0




Recall that g (w; 1)  g (w; 0) and that Cw (w) is strictly convex in w. As a result, we
have that





 C 0w (w) ,
where the last inequality follows because  (w)  0. But this results in a contradiction.
Hence, we conclude that g (w; 1)  w for all w in the interior of Dw. The fact that
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g (w; 1) is continuous implies that g (w; 1)  w holds for all w 2 Dw as claimed.
Q.E.D.
A repayment by a borrower in the settlement stage results in at least the same
terms of credit for future transactions within the credit relationship. If a borrower
reports the productive state of nature in the settlement stage and as a result makes a
repayment y (w) to his lender, his expected discounted utility at the beginning of the
following period g (w; 1) either rises or remains the same. This means that the terms of
credit for all future transactions within the relationship either become more favorable
or remain the same for him. This property of the optimal contract arises because
a lender cannot observe a borrowers ability to repay a loan in the settlement stage.
As a result, a lender needs to induce a repayment from a borrower who is currently
productive in the settlement stage by promising him at least the same terms of credit
for future transactions as those promised in the current period.
Lemma 20 The function g (w; 0) has the following properties: (i) g (w; 0) < w for all
w > w; (ii) g (w; 0) = w; and (iii) there exists  > 0 such that g (w; 0) = w for all
w 2 [w; w + ).
Proof. First, notice that we must have y (w) > 0 for all w 2 Dw. To verify
this claim, suppose that y (w) = 0 for some w 2 (w; w (w)). Then, we must have
g (w; 1) = g (w; 0) given that (3.3) holds with equality. Moreover, either g (w; 1) =
g (w; 0) = w (w) or g (w; 1) = g (w; 0) < w (w). If g (w; 1) = g (w; 0) = w (w), then
(2.14) and (2.16) imply that C 0w (w)  C 0w [ w (w)], which results in a contradiction.
Suppose now that g (w; 1) = g (w; 0) < w (w). From (2.14) and (2.16), we conclude
that g (w; 1) = g (w; 0) = w. Thus, we have that Cw (w) = H (w) > H (wa) = 0, which
implies a contradiction. Therefore, we must have y (w) > 0 for all w 2 (w; w (w)).
Continuity then implies that y (w) > 0 and y [ w (w)] > 0, so that y (w) > 0 for all
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w 2 Dw as claimed. As a result, g (w; 1) > g (w; 0) for all w 2 Dw.
Suppose that g (w; 0)  w for some w > w. From (2.14) and (2.16), we have that
C 0w (w)  C 0w [g (w; 0)] + (1  )C 0w [g (w; 1)] > C 0w (w) ,
where the last inequality follows from the fact that Cw (w) is strictly convex in w
and the fact that g (w; 1) > g (w; 0). But we obtain a contradiction. Hence, we must
have g (w; 0) < w for all w > w. Since g (w; 0) is continuous in w, it follows that
g (w; 0) = w.
Finally, to prove (iii), suppose that g (w + "; 0) > w for all " > 0. Then, (2.14)
and (2.16) require that
C 0w (w
 + ")  C 0w [g (w + "; 0)] + (1  )C 0w [g (w + "; 1)]
holds for all " > 0, which in turn requires that lim"!0 g (w + "; 1) = w. But this
implies a contradiction. Q.E.D.
If a borrower fails to make a repayment to his lender in the settlement stage, then
the terms of the contract become less favorable for him in all future transactions within
the credit relationship. As a result of intertemporal allocation of resources by a risk-
neutral lender, a delayed repayment is compensated by more favorable terms of credit
for future transactions.
Notice that the envelope condition (2.16) implies that the loan amount to which
a borrower is entitled in the transaction stage is strictly increasing in his promised
expected discounted utility w. As we have seen, the optimal provision of incentives
by a lender results in a lower promised expected discounted utility for a borrower who
reports the unproductive state and as a result fails to make a repayment. Thus, the
loan amount that a borrower receives from a lender in the subsequent transaction stage
shrinks, given that H [u^ (w)] is a strictly increasing function. This shows how the loan
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amount that a borrower receives from a lender in the current transaction depends on
the history of trades within the credit relationship.
It is useful to dene a statistic that summarizes the terms of credit within an
enduring relationship. Notice that the expected return to a lender on the current
transaction is given by
R (w)  (1  ) y (w)
H [u^ (w)]
, (2.17)
which summarizes the terms of credit for the current transaction. Notice that the
expected return to a lender depends on w and uctuates over time as a result.
Lemma 21 The statistic R (w) dened by (2.17) is strictly decreasing in w.
Proof. It remains to show that y (w) is non-increasing on Dw. To verify this
claim, suppose that there is an interval ~D  Dw on which y (w) is strictly increasing.
Then, there is an interval D^  ~D on which 0 < y (w) < h. Notice that (3.10)-(2.14)
imply that g (w; 1) is constant on D^. Then, (3.7) implies that g (w; 0) must be strictly
decreasing on D^. This necessarily means that  (w) = 0 for all w 2 D^. As a result, we
must have
C 0w (w) = C
0
w [g (w; 0)] + 1  
for all w 2 D^. But this implies a contradiction. Therefore, it must be that y (w) is
non-increasing on Dw as claimed. Q.E.D.
The statistic R (w), which is depicted in Figure 4, captures the evolution of the
terms of credit according to the history of trades (summarized by w). This means that
R (w) gives the worst terms of credit for a borrower while R [ w (w)] gives the best
terms of credit. A lower value for w in Dw implies that R (w) is relatively higher 
closer to the upper bound R (w). This means that the terms of credit for the current
transaction are less favorable for the borrower  and more favorable for the lender
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because he has had a weak history of repayments within the relationship. Worse
terms of credit for a borrower mean that he is entitled to a lower loan amount in the
transaction stage and/or is required to make a bigger repayment in the settlement
stage contingent on the realization of the productive state.
2.4 Changes in the Initial Cost of Lending
An important parameter in the model is the cost k > 0 that a lender has to pay in
order to post a credit contract. We have seen that there exists a su¢ ciently small
k > 0 such that, for any k < k, there exists a unique market utility w (k) such that
^ [w (k)] + (1  ) k = 0, where ^ (w)  Cw (w). Again, w (k) gives a borrowers
expected discounted utility from the perspective of the signing date. Given that ^ (w)
is a continuous function, for any k0 in a neighborhood of k, there exists a unique w (k0)
such that ^ [w (k0)]+(1  ) k0 = 0. Moreover, if k0 > k, we have that w (k0) < w (k);
if k0 < k, we have that w (k0) > w (k). In the proof of Lemma 3, we have established
that the upper bound w (w) on the set of expected discounted utilities is a non-
increasing function of the lower bound w. Thus, we have that Dw(k)  Dw(k0) if
k0 > k and that Dw(k0)  Dw(k) if k0 < k. This means that a lower value for k results
in a smaller set of expected discounted utilities.
We have some important implications. First, a lower value for k makes each bor-
rower better o¤ from the perspective of the signing date because the expected dis-
counted utility associated with the market contract rises a lower cost of entry results
in more competition in the credit market. Second, there is less variability in a bor-
rowers expected discounted utility over time. The terms of the contract are such that
a borrowers expected discounted utility uctuates within a smaller set according to
the history of trades. Third, a lenders cost function under k0 < k is uniformly above
her cost function under k see Figure 5. This means that a lower value for k makes
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each lender uniformly worse o¤ ex post.
We can interpret k > 0 as the initial cost of lending per customer for a lender
in the market for unsecured loans. If technological progress drives the cost to nearly
zero, we should expect small uctuations over time in a borrowers expected discounted
utility. Another prediction of the model is that borrowers obtain more favorable terms
of credit as the initial cost of lending approaches zero: they are promised a higher
expected discounted utility at the signing date.
Notice that as k ! 0 the credit contract o¤ered by a lender in equilibrium converges
to a full-insurance contract for each borrower. The equilibrium allocation converges to
a contract that delivers a constant loan amount in the transaction stage and requires
a constant repayment amount in the settlement stage contingent on the realization of
the productive state of nature. Finally, the terms of credit are converging to a constant
value R [w (0)].
2.5 Discussion
A property of the equilibrium allocation is that borrowers are di¤erentiated by lenders
exclusively according to their history of transactions loan and repayment amounts 
within each credit relationship. This means that two borrowers are treated di¤erently
by the lenders with whom they are paired only because they have had distinct histories
of repayments (due to di¤erent histories of productivity shock). Recall that at the rst
date each lender o¤ers the same contract to a borrower. In the model proposed in
this paper, borrowers are ex ante identical and face variable terms of credit over time
within their credit relationships as a result of di¤erent histories of productivity shock.
This is di¤erent from other theories of unsecured credit that assume that borrowers are
ex ante heterogeneous with respect to some characteristic. For instance, in Livshits,
MacGee, and Tertilt (2009), borrowers di¤er ex ante with respect to a characteristic
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that a¤ects their ability to repay a loan; in Chatterjee, Corbae, and Ríos-Rull (2008),
households di¤er ex ante with respect to the likelihood of a loss in their wealth.
In Drozd and Nosal (2008), borrowers are ex ante identical and di¤er ex post with
respect to their wealth and income. In their analysis, the terms of the contract are xed
over time within each relationship between a borrower and a lender. This is a su¢ cient
condition for obtaining default in equilibrium so that it is possible to interpret some
results as bankruptcy. The contribution of our paper is to perform the comparative
statics exercise of changing the initial cost of lending and to establish some properties
of the equilibrium allocation in an environment where no restriction on the space of
contracts is imposed. Although some properties that we obtain are similar a lower
initial cost of lending makes each borrower better o¤others arise precisely due to the
fact that the form of the contract is completely endogenous.
An important prediction of the model is that the equilibrium contract o¤ered by
a lender in the credit market converges to a full-insurance contract. In the limit, the
terms of credit, as measured by the statistic R (w), converge to a constant value. This
means that the expected return to a lender on each transaction will be constant over
time. Each borrower in the economy should get nearly the same terms of credit within
his credit relationship with a lender as a result of any technological progress that drives
the initial cost of lending to nearly zero. The history of transactions within each credit
relationship becomes irrelevant as the initial cost of lending approaches zero. This is an
important property of the dynamics of the model that we obtain from the assumptions
that it is costly to make a contact in the credit market and that lenders can only




In this section, we study the long-run properties of the equilibrium allocation. Specif-
ically, we show that there exists a well-behaved long-run distribution of expected dis-
counted utilities with mobility. Let 	(Dw ;D) be the space of all probability measures
 on the measurable space (Dw ;D), where D is the collection of Borel subsets of Dw.
Dene the operator T  on 	(Dw ;D) by
(T  ) (D0) = 
Z
Q0(D0)




for each D0 2 D, where, for each  2 f0; 1g, the set Q (D0) is given by
Q (D
0) = fw 2 Dw : g (w; ) 2 D0g .
Notice that a xed point of the operator T  corresponds to an invariant distribution
over Dw.
Lemma 22 The operator T  has a unique xed point  , and for any probability mea-
sure  in 	(Dw ;D), T n converges to  
 in the total variation norm.
Proof. Let  w denote the probability measure that concentrates mass on the point
w. I will show that there exist N  1 and " > 0 such that  T N w (w)  " for all
w 2 Dw. From Lemma 5, there exists k > 0 such that either g (w; 0)  w   k or
g (w; 0) = w for all w 2 Dw. Now, choose an integer N  1 large enough so that
w (w) kN  w. Then, the probability of moving from the point w (w) to the point
w in N steps is at least N . Since g (w; 0) is non-decreasing in w, such a transition
to w is at least as probable from any other point in Dw. Thus, if " = N , then the
implied Markov process satises the hypotheses of Theorem 11.12 of Stokey, Lucas,
and Prescott (1989), and the proof is complete. Q.E.D.
The existence of a non-degenerate long-run distribution derives from the fact that
there is no absorbing point, which implies that the entire state space is an ergodic
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set. The role of limited commitment is to bound the set of promised utilities, which
is necessary to obtain a non-degenerate long-run distribution. Specically, the lower
bound w on the set of expected discounted utility entitlements arises due to the fact
that a borrower can defect from his current contract and sign with another lender at
any moment. The upper bound w (w) is the highest expected discounted utility to
which a lender can commit to deliver to a borrower given that the lowest expected
discounted utility that can be promised is w.
2.7 Conclusion
We have characterized the terms of the contract that a lender o¤ers to a borrower in a
competitive credit market with the following characteristics: lenders are asymmetrically
informed about a borrowers ability to repay a loan; lenders can commit to some credit
contracts while borrowers cannot commit to any contract; the history of trades within
each enduring credit relationship in the economy is not publicly observable; and it is
costly for a lender to contact a borrower. These frictions result in a market contract
whose terms vary over time according to the history of trades within each long-term
credit relationship.
As the initial cost of lending goes to zero, the contract that a lender o¤ers to a
borrower in the credit market converges to a full-insurance contract. If technological
progress drives the cost to nearly zero, we should expect small uctuations over time
in a borrowers expected discounted utility. Another prediction of the model is that a
borrower obtains more favorable terms of credit as the initial cost of lending approaches
zero: a market contract is such that each borrower is better o¤ from the perspective of
the contracting date. Although we do not exploit the models quantitative implications
in this paper, we provide important properties of a lenders optimal contracting problem
in the market for unsecured loans.
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3 Costly Recordkeeping, Settlement System, and
Monetary Policy2
3.1 Introduction
We study the implications of a government-provided settlement system for the imple-
mentation of monetary policy. A key ingredient of the analysis is that it is costly for
the government to use a record-keeping technology which is necessary for the construc-
tion of a settlement system through which private loans and tax liabilities are settled.
In modern economies, it is common to observe a nancial arrangement in which the
government provides a public settlement system from which the private sector benets.
For instance, the Fedwire system in the U.S. facilitates the clearing of private debt and
provides an important service to a large number of nancial institutions. Participants
are required to pay a fee that is designed to nance the costs of providing such service.
A public settlement system is also useful for the collection of a tax liability. The
government needs to keep track of agentsidentities and trading histories in order to
enforce the payment of any tax liability. As a result, a record-keeping technology is
necessary not only to support credit arrangements in the private sector but also to
the operation of a scal system. For instance, the Treasury Tax and Loan (TT&L)
Service in the U.S. allows the government to e¤ectively collect a tax liability through
a centralized system whose operation also involves a cost. Hence, it is crucial to
evaluate the benets and costs involved in an institutional arrangement in which the
government provides a settlement system by using a costly record-keeping technology
and by enforcing the repayment of private loans and the collection of tax liabilities.
Given that it is costly for the government to use a record-keeping technology, what is
the optimal size of a public settlement system? What are the implications for optimal
monetary policy?
2Joint project with Pedro Gomis-Porqueras.
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The arrangement that we study in this paper is one in which the government pro-
vides a settlement system to the private sector in a centralized location. We build
on the models of Lagos and Wright (2005) and Rocheteau and Wright (2005). In
the Lagos-Wright model, the pattern of trade is such that private agents periodically
visit a centralized location where the government can interact with them. Within this
framework, Koeppl, Monnet, and Temzelides (2008) show that a settlement system in
a centralized location is essential for the implementation of an e¢ cient allocation. It
is necessary to have an institutional arrangement in which a centralized agency keeps
track of agentstrades and imposes a punishment on agents who default on their lia-
bilities. One possible arrangement involves a government-provided settlement system.
The novelty of our analysis is to assume that it is costly for the government to use a
record-keeping technology which is necessary to the operation of a settlement system.
If individuals cannot commit to their future promises, it is di¢ cult to support
credit transactions within the private sector. However, some credit arrangements can
be supported in equilibrium provided that the government can enforce the repayment
of private loans in a centralized location. In this paper, we assume that the only
punishment that the government can impose on an agent is the seizure of his or her
assets. However, the government can seize an agents assets only if it observes his or
her identity, which means that it needs to use a record-keeping technology to monitor
individuals in the private sector. Given that it is costly for the government to keep
track of agentstransactions, it may not be socially optimal to monitor all transactions
in the economy in order to support credit arrangements within the private sector.
This means that the choice of the optimal size of a settlement system is non-trivial.
Although a settlement system allows private agents to expand the set of feasible trades,
its operation results in a social cost due to a costly record-keeping technology.
A settlement system is also essential for the implementation of monetary policy.
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Suppose that the monetary authority intervenes in the economy through a lump-sum
transfer or tax in a centralized location. Then, it can e¤ectively control the money
supply only if it uses a record-keeping technology. To expand the money supply, the
monetary authority needs to keep track of whom has already received a nominal transfer
in a given period. To contract the money supply, the monetary authority needs to
collect a lump-sum nominal tax in a centralized location. To enforce the payment of
a lump-sum tax, the government needs to use a record-keeping technology to identify
an individual in the private sector and e¤ectively impose a punishment on her if she
refuses to pay her tax liability. Even if the government identies an agent and requires
her to pay a lump-sum tax, it must be an incentive-compatible scheme, as in Andolfatto
(2008, 2009). As a result, a settlement system expands the set of feasible public policies
available to the government.
Our main result is to show that the Friedman rule is suboptimal and that the
government relies on a credit system to implement an optimal policy. At the Friedman
rule there is no credit activity: all trade is carried out with at money. This happens
because such a policy essentially eliminates the opportunity cost of holding money
over periods and individuals do not economize on their money holdings. However,
the implementation of the Friedman rule involves a social cost due to the fact that
it requires the use of a record-keeping technology to enforce the payment of a tax
liability. Then, we show that it is possible to construct a welfare-improving deviation
from the Friedman rule. Moving away from the Friedman rule results in a lower rate
of return on money holdings. However, a deviation from the Friedman rule allows the
government to reduce the size of the settlement system and consequently minimize its
social cost. We show that this deviation results in higher welfare because it induces
credit transactions in the private sector, which permits the cash constraint in some
transactions to be relaxed. In this sense, a credit system complements the operation
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of a monetary system.
The importance of a settlement system for the implementation of government poli-
cies in monetary economies has been emphasized by many authors, including Free-
man (1996), Aiyagari and Williamson (2000), Temzelides and Williamson (2001),
Williamson (2003), Nosal and Rocheteau (2006, 2009), Kanh and Roberds (2009),
Williamson and Wright (2010a, 2010b), among others. Our paper contributes to this
literature by exploiting the implications of a costly record-keeping technology for the
e¤ective operation of a monetary system.
3.2 Historical Background
Systematic recordkeeping has been common among large-scale societies, even those
lacking widespread literacy. This includes simple record-keeping technologies, such as
the Sumerian token dating back to 8,000 B.C. The Sumerians began using stone and
baked clay tokens to symbolically represent agricultural commodities that had been
physically transferred. By 4,000 B.C., complex incised tokens were used to signify
manufactured goods. Shortly before 3,200 B.C., tokens began to be sealed inside
hollow clay balls (bullae) that protected against fraud by imprinting signatures of
the transacting parties and witnesses (via seals) on the envelopes exterior. The bullae
were then baked, making the records permanent and di¢ cult to alter. Over time new
forms of recordkeeping emerged such as the tally stick, which was used for centuries
in England and in rural France as recently as 1970, the knotted string, and the
double-entry bookkeeping see Robert (1956). Common properties among all of these
forms of recordkeeping are the di¤erent degrees of monitoring and enforcement needed
to operate them as well as the costs involved.
In recent times, the innovations in information technology have signicantly im-
proved societiesability to maintain up-to-date records of transactions. As a result, a
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large variety of payment systems has developed in industrialized economies. Many of
these systems are government-sponsored, such as the Fedwire in the U.S. and TAR-
GET in the Euro area, and involve a large number of transfers daily among nancial
institutions.
Recordkeeping is not only crucial for private transactions but also for tax collec-
tion purposes. This important use of a record-keeping technology has been observed
throughout history. For instance, tomb paintings depict tax collectors in Egypt at least
as early as 2,000 B.C. The Egyptians kept written records of title deeds and eld sizes.
To assess the farmerswealth there were also cattle counts. But not everybodys means
of livelihood could be taxed as easily as the farmers, and attempts were made to tax
other parts of the population. In order to increase the tax base, Late Period Egyptians
had to declare their income, and if any man did not make declaration of an honest way
of living, he was punished with death. In modern societies, the scal authority faces
essentially the same issues, and the punishment for default on a tax liability usually
involves the conscation of an individuals assets.
As we can see, regardless of the time period considered, a record-keeping technology
is costly for society, is needed to inict punishments on individuals, and is necessary for
taxing economic activity. In this paper, we incorporate these important characteristics
of a record-keeping technology into a search-theoretic model of money and study their
e¤ects on the design of optimal monetary policy.
3.3 The Model
3.3.1 Private Sector
There is a continuum of innitely-lived buyers and sellers. Each buyer is indexed by
i 2 [0; 1] and each seller is indexed by j 2 [0; 1]. Time is discrete and each period is
divided into two subperiods: day and night. Within each subperiod, there is a unique
perishable consumption good that is produced and consumed. In the day subperiod,
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a seller does not want to consume but can produce one unit of the consumption good
with one unit of labor. In the night subperiod, a seller wants to consume but is not able
to produce. A buyer wishes to consume only in the day subperiod but can produce one
unit of the consumption good with one unit of labor in the night subperiod. Neither
a buyer nor a seller can commit to his or her promises. This structure generates an
absence-of-double-coincidence problem so that a medium of exchange can expand the
set of feasible trades.
A buyer has preferences given by
u(qi)  ni, (3.1)
where qi is his consumption during the day and ni is his labor supply at night. Assume
that u : R+ ! R+ is strictly concave, increasing, and continuously di¤erentiable, with
u(0) = 0 and u0 (0) =1. A seller has preferences given by
 nj + qj, (3.2)
where nj is her labor supply during the day and qj is her consumption at night. Buyers
and sellers have a common discount factor between periods which we denote by  2
(0; 1).
Agents are randomly and bilaterally matched in the day subperiod in such a way
that each buyer meets a seller. In the night subperiod, agents interact in a central-
ized location. The terms of trade in the day market are determined by the following
bargaining protocol. In each bilateral meeting, both agents simultaneously announce
their willingness to trade. If both agree to trade, then the buyer makes a take-it-or-
leave-it o¤er to the seller, who either accepts or rejects it. Otherwise, no trade takes
place. In the night market, there is a Walrasian market in the centralized location.
This sequential market structure, together with quasilinear utility with respect to labor
supply, results in a degenerate end-of-period distribution of money balances across the
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population of buyers, as in Lagos and Wright (2005).
3.3.2 Government
There is a record-keeping technology that allows the government to observe the iden-
tities of a xed fraction of sellers and record their individual trading histories. We
say that a monitored seller is one that has her identity and trading history observed
by the government. The identities and transactions of their trading partners are also
recorded, as in Cavalcanti and Wallace (1999) and Sanches and Williamson (2009). As
a result, a buyer who trades with a monitored seller in the decentralized market has his
identity and transactions revealed in the day and night markets of the current period.
If the government wishes to keep track of a xed fraction  of sellers, the ow cost per
seller in terms of the consumption good is given by + , where  and  are positive
constants. This cost is paid in the centralized location in the night subperiod.
If the government decides to use the record-keeping technology, it can share the
information with the private sector without any additional cost. The government can
interact with agents only in the centralized location and can seize an agents assets
provided that it identies such an agent in the current period. This means that the
government can seize the assets of a particular agent only if it uses a record-keeping
technology.
3.4 Discussion
Given that there is no additional cost for the government to share the information
about identities and transactions that it obtains by using a record-keeping technology,
it can construct a settlement system through which private debt and tax liabilities can
be settled. First, notice that, by making the identities and trading histories of agents
publicly observable, a record-keeping technology makes credit arrangements within the
private sector feasible. Recall that agents cannot commit to their future promises,
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which makes it di¢ cult to support credit transactions. However, some credit arrange-
ments can be supported in equilibrium provided that the government can enforce the
repayment of private loans in the centralized location. The only punishment that the
government can impose on an agent is the seizure of his or her assets. However, the gov-
ernment can seize an agents assets only if it observes his or her identity, which means
that it needs to use a record-keeping technology to monitor agents in the private sector.
One way that the government can enforce the repayment of a private loan is to
announce that any seller who trades with a buyer who has defaulted on his private
loan will have her assets seized in the centralized location. This means that a buyer
who has defaulted on his private loan will only be able to trade with anonymous sellers
in the decentralized market. The threat of this punishment induces cooperation among
buyers. In this way, the government provides a settlement system in the centralized
location through which private debt is settled. Hence, a benet of the record-keeping
technology is that it provides a service to private agents that permits them to expand
the set of feasible trades.
Second, a record-keeping technology allows the government to collect a tax liability
in the centralized location. For instance, if the government wishes to shrink the money
supply, it could levy a lump-sum nominal tax on buyers. Due to lack of commitment,
the government needs to impose a punishment on private agents to enforce the payment
of a tax liability in the centralized location. Again, it can announce that it will seize the
assets of any seller who trades with a buyer who has defaulted on his tax liability. The
threat of this punishment can induce buyers to pay a lump-sum tax in the centralized
location. As a result, the government can e¤ectively control the money supply only if
it uses the record-keeping technology, which means that the settlement system is also
useful for the implementation of public policies.
Finally, notice that the government is able to precisely infer a monitored sellers
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money holdings at the end of each subperiod, which means that it can e¤ectively
impose a punishment on each one of them. The government can infer a monitored
sellers money holdings by simply keeping track of her transactions. These agents have
all of their transactions publicly observable and as a result the government can keep
track of their money holdings over time.
3.5 Monetary Equilibrium
Suppose that each buyer is endowed with one unit of at money at the beginning of
the rst day. We restrict attention to monetary equilibria in which the money supply
grows at the gross rate    and aggregate real money balances are constant over
time. The government injects new money in the centralized location through lump-
sum transfers to buyers. To receive a lump-sum transfer, a buyer needs to identify
himself in the centralized location. Those buyers who traded with a monitored seller
in the decentralized market of the current period already have their identities publicly
observable. Those buyers who remained anonymous in the current period those who
traded with anonymous sellers in the decentralized market have an incentive to reveal
their identities and receive a nominal transfer from the government.
If the government wishes to shrink the money supply, it needs to levy a lump-sum
tax on buyers. The government is able to collect a nominal tax only from buyers
who are currently being monitored  those who traded with a monitored seller in
the decentralized market. A buyer who remained anonymous in the current period
has no incentive to voluntarily identify himself and pay a lump-sum tax, so that the
government does not expect to receive a nominal payment from him.
If the government wishes to monitor sellers, it needs to pay a ow cost  +  per
seller in terms of the consumption good. There is a fee  b in terms of the consumption
good that is designed to nance the use of a record-keeping technology. The settle-
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ment system provided by the government allows it to e¤ectively collect such a fee in
the centralized location. To enforce the payment of a tax liability, the government
announces that it will seize the assets of any seller who decides to trade with a buyer
who has defaulted on his tax liability. This punishment implies that a buyer who has
defaulted on his tax liability is e¤ectively banished from the public settlement system.
Only anonymous sellers accept to trade with such a buyer, in which case they require
at money in exchange for goods.
Let v denote a buyers expected discounted utility at the end of the night subperiod.
Let  denote the real value of the lump-sum transfer to each buyer in the centralized
location. Suppose rst that  < 0, so that the government announces a lump-sum tax.
























subject to the incentive constraint,
 l    b +  + v  v^, (3.3)
wherem denotes a buyers real money balances, l denotes a loan amount from a seller in
a monitored meeting, and v^ denotes the value of defection. In the decentralized market,
a buyer who trades with a monitored seller hands out all of his money balances to such
a seller and also obtains a loan amount. His identity is revealed and his transactions
are recorded: the settlement system ensures that the repayment of a loan as well as
the payment of tax liabilities a fee  b and a lump-sum transfer  become publicly
observable. To enforce the repayment of a private loan, the government announces
that any monitored seller who trades with a buyer who has defaulted on his private
loan will have her assets seized in the centralized location.
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subject to (3.3). If the government announces a lump-sum transfer in the central-
ized location, then the buyers who remained anonymous in the decentralized market
are willing to identify themselves in the centralized location and receive the nominal
transfer from the government, so that all buyers receive a lump-sum transfer from the
government.
The government chooses the money growth factor  2 [;1) and the size of the
settlement system  2 [0; 1]. In a monetary equilibrium, the governments budget
constraints are given by
 b =

+  if  2 (0; 1],
















, if  2 [1;1) and  2 [0; 1] ,
where m denotes the real money balances that each buyer holds at the end of each
period.
Consider now the value of defection v^. If a buyer defaults on either his tax lia-
bilities or private loan, he will only be able to trade in anonymous meetings in the
decentralized market using currency. Given that the government announces that it
will seize a monitored sellers money holdings if she decides to trade with a defaulter,
only anonymous sellers will nd it protable to trade with him. For a given buyer, an
















(1  ) v^ =  z +  (1  )u (z) , (3.4)
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where the buyers consumption z after defection is given by
u0 (z) =

 (1  ) . (3.5)
Notice that z is strictly decreasing in both  and . A higher ination rate reduces
the value of defection for a buyer because he will only be able to use currency in
transactions. A higher fraction of monitored sellers reduces the value of defection for a
buyer because he will only be able to trade with anonymous sellers in the decentralized
market.
Let x denote a buyers consumption in an anonymous meeting in the decentralized
market and let y denote his consumption in a monitored meeting. In a monetary
equilibrium, a buyers expected discounted utility v can be written as
(1  ) v =   (1  )x+  [u (y)  y     ] +  (1  ) [u (x)  x] :
Now, we can formally dene a monetary equilibrium for the whole economy.
Denition 3 Given  2 [; 1) and  2 (0; 1], a stationary monetary equilibrium is a
triple (x; y; z), with 0  x  y  q, satisfying the rst-order conditions (3.5) and
u0 (y) + (1  )u0 (x) = 

, (3.6)
and satisfying the incentive constraint,
u (y)  (1   + ) (y + + ) +  (1  ) [u (x)  x]
 (1  ) (1  )   1   1 x+ (1  ) v^, (3.7)
where y = q if (3.7) does not bind and v^ is given by (3.4). Given   1 and  2 [0; 1],
a stationary monetary equilibrium is a triple (x; y; z), with 0  x  y  q, satisfying
the rst-order conditions (3.5) and (3.6) and satisfying the incentive constraint,
u (y)  (1   + ) (y + + ) +  (1  ) [u (x)  x]  (1  ) v^, (3.8)
where y = q if (3.8) does not bind.
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We need to show the existence and uniqueness of a stationary monetary equilibrium,
especially an unconstrained equilibrium one in which a buyers incentive constraint
does not bind and the e¢ cient quantity q is traded in each monitored meeting in the
decentralized market. We show next that a unique unconstrained monetary equilibrium
exists for any money growth factor    provided that the size of the settlement
system is not too small.
Proposition 23 Suppose that u (q)  q    > 0. Then, for any  2 [;1), there
exists ~ () 2 (0; 1) such that an unconstrained monetary equilibrium exists provided
 2 [~ () ; 1]. In such an equilibrium, it follows that y = q, x is given by (3.6), and z
is given by (3.5).
Proof. Suppose that  2 [; 1). If the incentive constraint (3.7) is slack, then we
have y = q. Notice that there exists a unique ^ 2 (0; 1) such that
u (q)  (1   + ) (q + + )  0
if and only if  2 [^; 1] provided that  2  ; 1, where  is such that u (q)  
q       = 0. Second, notice that, for any    and  2 (0; 1), we have that









and z given by (3.5). Notice that the term (1  ) (1  ) ( 1   1)x on the right-
hand side of the incentive constraint (3.7) goes to zero as  ! 1 from below. Hence,
there exists ~ () 2 (0; 1) such that a unique unconstrained monetary equilibrium exists
provided that  2 [~ () ; 1].
Suppose now that  2 [1;1). Then, the incentive constraint (3.8) is satised for
any  2 [^; 1]. Then, there exists ~ ()  ^ such that a unique unconstrained monetary
equilibrium exists provided that  2 [~ () ; 1]. Q.E.D.
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For any given money growth factor   , a bigger size of the settlement system
makes it harder to satisfy a buyers incentive constraint because a bigger fee  b is
needed to nance the use of the record-keeping technology. If the government wishes
to implement a deationary policy, there is an additional term on the right-hand side
of a buyers incentive constraint due to a lump-sum nominal tax in the centralized
location. Notice that a bigger size of the settlement system in fact reduces the real
value of the lump-sum tax and makes it easier to satisfy a buyers incentive constraint.
For this reason, there exists a minimum size of the settlement system for which an
unconstrained monetary equilibrium exists when the money growth factor  lies in
[; 1).
3.6 Optimal Monetary Policy
A governments policy involves the choice of the money growth factor  and the size
 of the settlement system. Throughout the analysis, we assume that the government
can induce the unique unconstrained monetary equilibrium with a choice of the policy
instruments. The social welfare associated with a stationary monetary equilibrium
(x; y; z) is given by
 [u (y)  y] + (1  ) [u (x)  x]   (+ ) . (3.10)
Notice that a settlement system results in a social welfare loss, which is expressed by
the last term in (3.10). Society needs to use real resources to keep track of agents
trading histories.
The benets of using a record-keeping technology are that it allows credit arrange-
ments within the private sector and permits the government to increase the rate of
return on money holdings. In an unconstrained monetary equilibrium, it follows that
y = q, so that the e¢ cient quantity is traded in each monitored meeting in the decen-
tralized market. If the government decides to implement the Friedman rule by setting
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 = , we have that x = q, so that the e¢ cient quantity is also traded in each anony-
mous meeting in the decentralized market. This policy maximizes social welfare for
any given choice of . However, we need to verify whether such a policy is in fact
feasible given that it requires a lump-sum tax from buyers.
Lemma 24 There exists ~ () 2 (0; 1) such that the Friedman rule is feasible if and
only if  2 [~ () ; 1].
Proof. Let B = f(; ) :  2 [0; 1] and   g  R2+. Dene the functions h : B !
R and g : B ! R by
h (; ) = u (q)  (1   + ) (q + + ) +  (1  ) fu [x (; )]  x (; )g
and
g (; ) =  (1  )u [z (; )]  z (; ) + (1  ) (1  )   1   1 x (; ) ,
where x : B ! R+ and z : B ! R+ are given by x (; ) = (u0) 1
h 
 1   (1  ) 1i




. Also, dene  : B ! R by  (; )  h (; ) 
g (; ). Notice that
h (; ) = u (q)  q   (1   + ) (+ ) ,
where (@h=@) (; ) < 0 for all , h (0; ) = u (q)   q   (1  ), and h (1; ) =
u (q)  q     . Also, we have that







where (@g=@) (; ) < 0 for all . Finally, notice that g (; )!1 as ! 0 from above
and g (; )! 0 as ! 1 from below. Hence, there exists a unique ~ () 2 (0; 1) such
that  (; ) = 0 if and only if  = ~ () and  (; ) > 0 if and only if  2 (~ () ; 1].
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Therefore, the Friedman rule is a feasible policy if and only if  2 [~ () ; 1]. Q.E.D.
The policy combination (; ) = (; ~ ()) implies that the e¢ cient quantity q is
always traded in the decentralized market. If the government wants to implement the
Friedman rule, it is optimal for the government to choose the minimum size of the
settlement system consistent with the feasibility of such a policy, which is given by  =
~ (). To verify this claim, notice that at the Friedman rule there is no credit activity
because y = x = q there is only monetary exchange in the decentralized market.
This means that the only reason for the government to use a record-keeping technology
is that it allows the government to e¤ectively collect a lump-sum nominal tax that is
required to generate a deation in the economy. As a result, it is optimal for the
government to minimize the loss in social welfare associated with the implementation
of the Friedman rule. However, such a policy is infeasible if the size of the settlement
system is too small a smaller size of the settlement system makes it more expensive
for a buyer to pay for the lump-sum tax.
It is straightforward to show that the policy combination (; ~ ()) dominates any
other policy combination (; ) such that    and   ~ (). All of these com-
binations imply a lower expected payo¤ from trade for a buyer and a higher loss in
social welfare associated with the use of a record-keeping technology. This means that
~ () is an upper bound for the optimal size of a settlement system. Moreover, the
smaller the cost of this system the smaller the values for  and  the smaller is
the upper bound ~ (). However, the policy combination (; ) = (; ~ ()) does not
achieve the highest level of social welfare. We show next that it is possible to construct
a welfare-improving deviation from the Friedman rule.
Lemma 25 The Friedman rule is suboptimal.
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Proof. By the Implicit Function Theorem, there exist open intervals U and V , with
~ () 2 U and  2 V , such that there exists a unique function ~ : V ! U such that
 [~ () ; ] = 0 for all  2 V . Moreover, ~ is continuously di¤erentiable with
~0 () =  @ [~ () ; ]
@





We have that (@=@) [~ () ; ] > 0 and (@=@) [~ () ; ] > 0, which implies ~0 () <
0. Since ~ is continuously di¤erentiable, there exists  > 0 such that ~0 () < 0 for all
 2 [;  +), so that ~ is strictly decreasing on [;  +).
In any unconstrained monetary equilibrium, social welfare is given by
W (; ) =  [u (q)  q     ] + (1  ) fu [x (; )]  x (; )g ,
for all    and  2 [0; 1]. Let 1 > 0 and 2 > 0. Given that ~ is strictly decreasing
in  on [;  +), the direction (d; d) = ( 1; 2) is feasible from (; ) = [~ () ; ]
provided that 1 and 2 are su¢ ciently small. The total variation in welfare is given
by
[+ 2~ ()] 1 > 0,
which means that there exists a welfare-improving deviation from the Friedman rule.
Q.E.D.
Moving away from the Friedman rule results in a lower rate of return on money
holdings. However, such a deviation allows the government to reduce the size of the
settlement system and consequently reduce its social cost. We have shown that the
latter e¤ect dominates and such a deviation results in higher welfare: the gain at
the extensive margin more than compensates for the loss at the intensive margin.
An immediate implication of this result is that money and credit coexist as means
of payment under the optimal payment arrangement. There is a role for credit in
transactions in the sense that credit helps in relaxing a cash constraint.
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If there is no cost of using a record-keeping technology, then for any given value of
 an e¢ cient allocation can be implemented by setting  =  (the Friedman rule) see
Sanches and Williamson (2009). In this case, there is no credit activity at the optimum:
all trade is carried out with at money. The government essentially eliminates the
opportunity cost of holding money balances by setting  = , so that individuals
do not economize on their money holdings and the e¢ cient quantity is traded in the
decentralized market. As a result, the governments optimal policy does not rely on
the existence of a credit system.
If a record-keeping technology is costly, the implementation of the Friedman rule
involves a social cost. One alternative for the government is to induce credit transac-
tions in the economy through the settlement system by deviating from the Friedman
rule. This choice permits the government to reduce the social cost associated with
the use of a record-keeping technology. Although the e¢ cient quantity will not be
traded in each anonymous meeting in the decentralized market, such a quantity will
be traded in each monitored meeting because of the role of credit in relaxing a cash
constraint. This essentially means that the loss in the intensive margin associated with
a deviation from the Friedman rule happens only in anonymous transactions, which are
exclusively carried out with at money. For this reason, welfare increases as a result
of the proposed deviation.
In an environment where a record-keeping technology is costly, the government
relies on a credit system to implement an optimal policy. In this sense, money and
credit are complementary in transactions: the existence of a credit system makes the
operation of a monetary system more e¤ective.
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3.7 Conclusion
We study an arrangement in which the government provides a settlement system
through which private loans and tax liabilities are settled. The existence of a credit
system requires a record-keeping technology to enforce credit contracts within the pri-
vate sector, which in turn results in a social cost due to the fact that it is costly to
use a record-keeping technology. Fiat money is an alternative to credit as a means
of payment, but there is an opportunity cost of holding money balances over periods.
One way to reduce this cost is by generating a deation to increase the rate of return
on money holdings. In our environment, the implementation of a deationary policy
requires the use of a record-keeping technology to enforce the payment of a tax liability,
which means that the e¤ective operation of a monetary system also involves a social
cost.
There exists a minimum size of a settlement system that is consistent with the fea-
sibility of the Friedman rule. As a result, the e¢ cient implementation of the Friedman
rule involves the choice of such a minimum size in order to minimize the social cost asso-
ciated with its implementation. However, it is possible to construct a welfare-improving
deviation from the Friedman rule. The benet of reducing the size of the settlement
system more than compensates the higher opportunity cost of holding money over pe-
riods the e¤ect on the extensive margin dominates the e¤ect on the intensive margin
at the Friedman rule. This happens because of the role of credit in relaxing a cash
constraint in some transactions: a deviation from the Friedman rule induces credit
transactions through the settlement system. As a result, the government relies on a
credit system to implement an optimal policy.
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Figure 5 -  Lender’s Cost Function
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